

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.,
APPLICANTS

v.

RYAN KARNOSKI, ET AL.

APPLICATION FOR A STAY IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Applicants (defendants-appellants below) are Donald J. Trump, in his official capacity as President of the United States; the United States of America; James Mattis, in his official capacity as Secretary of Defense; and the United States Department of Defense.

Respondents (plaintiffs-appellees below) are Ryan Karnoski; Cathrine Schmid, Staff Sergeant; D. L., by his next friend and mother, FKA: K. G.; Laura Garza; Human Rights Campaign Fund; Gender Justice League; Lindsey Muller, Chief Warrant Officer; Terece Lewis, Petty Officer First Class; Phillip Stephens, Petty Officer Second Class; Megan Winters, Petty Officer Second Class; Jane Doe; Conner Callahan; and American Military Partner Association. Respondents also include the State of Washington, Attorney General's Office Civil Rights Unit (intervenor-plaintiff-appellee below).

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 18-676

DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.,
APPLICANTS

v.

RYAN KARNOSKI, ET AL.

APPLICATION FOR A STAY IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE
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Pursuant to this Court's Rule 23 and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651, the Solicitor General, on behalf of applicants Donald J. Trump, et al., respectfully seeks, as an alternative to certiorari before judgment, a stay of the nationwide preliminary injunction issued by the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington (App., infra, 1a-23a, 24a-29a, 30a-60a), pending the consideration and disposition of the government's appeal from that injunction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and, if the court of appeals affirms the injunction, pending the filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari and any further proceedings in this Court. Should the Court decline to grant certiorari before judgment or stay the injunction in its entirety, the government respectfully

requests that the Court stay the nationwide scope of the injunction pending the resolution of the government's appeal in the court of appeals and any further proceedings in this Court.

The district court in this case preliminarily enjoined the military from implementing a policy that Secretary of Defense James Mattis announced earlier this year after an extensive review of military service by transgender individuals. In arriving at that new policy, Secretary Mattis and a panel of senior military leaders and other experts determined that the prior policy, adopted by Secretary Mattis's predecessor, posed too great a risk to military effectiveness and lethality. As a result of the court's nationwide preliminary injunction, however, the military has been forced to maintain that prior policy for nearly a year.

The government has appealed that injunction and has filed a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment to the court of appeals.¹ The government now files this application for a stay of the injunction as an alternative to certiorari before judgment. The government seeks such a stay only if the Court denies certiorari before judgment. If the Court grants certiorari before

¹ The petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment in this case (No. 18-676) was filed on November 23, 2018, and docketed that same day. As explained more fully in a letter filed in this Court with the certiorari petition, the government's filing of the petition on November 23 allows the petition to be distributed on December 26, 2018, for consideration at the Court's January 11, 2019 conference, without a motion for expedition. The government respectfully requests that this stay application be considered simultaneously with the certiorari petition.

judgment, it would presumably render a decision in this case by the end of June 2019. Because such a decision would potentially allow the military to begin implementing the Mattis policy in the reasonably near future, the government does not seek interim relief in the event the Court grants certiorari before judgment.

Should the Court deny certiorari before judgment, however, a decision by the Court this Term would no longer be possible. Even if the government were immediately to seek certiorari from an adverse decision of the court of appeals, this Court would not be able to review that decision until next Term. Absent a stay, the nationwide injunction would thus remain in place for at least another year and likely well into 2020 -- a period too long for the military to be forced to maintain a policy that it has determined, in its professional judgment, to be contrary to the Nation's interests. The government therefore respectfully requests a stay of the injunction pending further proceedings in the court of appeals and this Court, in the event this Court denies certiorari before judgment.

At a minimum, the Court should stay the nationwide scope of the injunction, so that the injunction prohibits the implementation of the Mattis policy only as to the nine individual respondents who are currently serving in the military or seeking to join it -- namely, Karnoski, Schmid, D. L., Muller, Lewis, Stephens, Winters, Doe, and Callahan. Such a narrower injunction -- which would limit the district court's preliminary remedy to

the parties in this case -- would allow the military to implement the Mattis policy in part while litigation proceeds through 2019 and into 2020. This Court has previously stayed a nationwide injunction against a military policy to the extent it swept beyond the parties to the case, see United States Dep't of Def. v. Meinhold, 510 U.S. 939 (1993), and it should, at a minimum, grant such a partial stay here.²

* * * * *

It is with great reluctance that we seek such emergency relief in this Court. Unfortunately this case is part of a growing trend in which federal district courts, at the behest of particular plaintiffs, have issued nationwide injunctions, typically on a preliminary basis, against major policy initiatives. Such injunctions previously were rare, but in recent years they have become routine. In less than two years, federal courts have issued 25 of them, blocking a wide range of significant policies involving national security, national defense, immigration, and domestic issues.

In cases involving these extraordinary nationwide injunctions, moreover, several courts have issued equally extraordinary discovery orders, compelling massive and intrusive discovery into Executive-Branch decision-making, including blanket

² In accordance with this Court's Rule 23.3, the government also moved in the district court and the court of appeals for a stay of the injunction -- and, at a minimum, its nationwide scope -- pending appeal. Both courts denied a stay. See App., infra, 61a-68a.

abrogations of the deliberative-process privilege. In the face of these actions, we have had little choice but to seek relief in the courts of appeals; and when that has proven unavailing, to do so in this Court. Absent such relief, the Executive will continue to be denied the ability to implement significant policy measures, subject to appropriate checks by an independent Judiciary in resolving individual cases and controversies.

STATEMENT

A. The Military's Policies

1. To assemble a military of "qualified, effective, and able-bodied persons," 10 U.S.C. 505(a), the Department of Defense (Department) has traditionally set demanding standards for military service, Karnoski Pet. App. 116a.³ "The vast majority of Americans from ages 17 to 24 -- that is, 71% -- are ineligible to join the military without a waiver for mental, medical, or behavioral reasons." Id. at 125a.

Given the "unique mental and emotional stresses of military service," Karnoski Pet. App. 132a, a history of "[m]ost mental health conditions and disorders" is "automatically disqualifying," id. at 151a. In general, the military has aligned the disorders it has deemed disqualifying with those listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA). Id. at 132a-133a. The

³ References to "Karnoski Pet." and "Karnoski Pet. App." are to the petition for a writ of certiorari and the appendix to that petition filed in this case (No. 18-676) on November 23, 2018.

1980 edition of the DSM listed, among other disorders, "transsexualism." Id. at 133a. When the DSM was updated in 1994, "transsexualism" was subsumed within, and replaced by, the term "'gender identity disorder.'" Ibid. (citation omitted); see C.A. E.R. 416.⁴

Consistent with the inclusion of "'transsexualism'" in the DSM, the military's accession standards -- the "standards that govern induction into the Armed Forces" -- had for decades disqualified individuals with a history of "'transsexualism'" from joining the military. Karnoski Pet. App. 126a-127a; see id. at 133a; C.A. E.R. 482. And although the military's retention standards -- the "standards that govern the retention and separation of persons already serving in the Armed Forces" -- did not "require" separating "'transsexual[]'" servicemembers from service, "'transsexualism'" was a "permissible basis" for doing so. Karnoski Pet. App. 127a.

2. In 2013, the APA published a new edition of the DSM, which replaced the term "gender identity disorder" with "gender dysphoria." Karnoski Pet. App. 136a. That change reflected the APA's view that, when there are no "accompanying symptoms of distress, transgender individuals" -- individuals who identify with a gender different from their biological sex -- do not have "a diagnosable mental disorder." C.A. E.R. 416; see Karnoski Pet. App. 204a.

⁴ References to the "C.A. E.R." are to the excerpts of record filed in the court of appeals in No. 18-35347.

According to the APA, a diagnosis of gender dysphoria should be reserved for individuals who experience a “marked incongruence between [their] experienced/expressed gender and assigned gender, of at least 6 months’ duration,” associated with “clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.” C.A. E.R. 417; see Karnoski Pet. App. 136a-138a. Treatment for gender dysphoria often involves psychotherapy and, in some cases, may include gender transition through cross-sex hormone therapy, sex-reassignment surgery, or living and working in the preferred gender. Karnoski Pet. App. 155a-156a; C.A. E.R. 345-346. The APA emphasizes that “[n]ot all transgender people suffer from gender dysphoria.” Karnoski Pet. App. 152a (citation omitted; brackets in original). “Conversely, not all persons with gender dysphoria are transgender.” Id. at 152a n.57; see ibid. (giving the example of men who suffer genital wounds in combat and who “feel that they are no longer men because their bodies do not conform to their concept of manliness”) (citation omitted).

3. In June 2016, then-Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter ordered the armed forces to adopt a new policy on “Military Service of Transgender Service Members.” Karnoski Pet. App. 87a. In a shift from the military’s longstanding policy, Secretary Carter declared that “transgender individuals shall be allowed to serve in the military.” Id. at 88a. But Secretary Carter recognized the need for “[m]edical standards” to “help to ensure that those

entering service are free of medical conditions or physical defects that may require excessive time lost from duty.” Id. at 91a. Secretary Carter thus ordered the military to adopt, by July 1, 2017, new accession standards that would “disqualify[]” any applicant with a history of gender dysphoria or a history of medical treatment associated with gender transition (including a history of sex reassignment or genital reconstruction surgery), unless the applicant met certain medical criteria. Id. at 91a-92a. An applicant with a history of medical treatment associated with gender transition, for example, would be disqualified unless the applicant provided certification from a licensed medical provider that the applicant had completed all transition-related medical treatment and had been stable in the preferred gender for 18 months. Id. at 92a. If the applicant provided the requisite certification, the applicant would be permitted to enter the military and serve in the preferred gender.

Secretary Carter also imposed new retention standards, effective immediately, prohibiting the discharge of any servicemember on the basis of gender identity. Karnoski Pet. App. 91a. Under the Carter policy, current servicemembers who received a diagnosis of gender dysphoria from a military medical provider would be permitted to undergo gender transition at government expense and serve in their preferred gender upon completing the transition. C.A. E.R. 219-236; see Karnoski Pet. App. 93a. Transgender servicemembers without a diagnosis of gender dysphoria,

by contrast, would be required to continue serving in their biological sex. See Karnoski Pet. App. 128a; C.A. E.R. 221-222.

4. On June 30, 2017 -- the day before the Carter accession standards were set to take effect -- Secretary of Defense James Mattis determined, "after consulting with the Service Chiefs and Secretaries," that it was "necessary to defer" those standards until January 1, 2018, so that the military could "evaluate more carefully" their potential effect "on readiness and lethality." Karnoski Pet. App. 96a. Without "presuppos[ing] the outcome" of that study, Secretary Mattis explained that it was his intent to obtain "the views of the military leadership and of the senior civilian officials who are now arriving in the Department" and to "continue to treat all Service members with dignity and respect." Id. at 97a.

While that study was ongoing, the President stated on Twitter on July 26, 2017, that "the United States Government will not accept or allow" "Transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military." Karnoski Pet. App. 98a. The President issued a memorandum in August 2017 noting the ongoing study and directing the military to "return to the longstanding policy and practice on military service by transgender individuals that was in place prior to June 2016 until such time as a sufficient basis exists upon which to conclude that terminating that policy and practice would not have * * * negative effects" on the military. Id. at 100a. The President ordered Secretary Mattis to submit "a plan for implementing" a return to the longstanding pre-Carter

policy by February 2018, while emphasizing that the Secretary could “advise [him] at any time, in writing, that a change to th[at] policy is warranted.” Id. at 100a-101a.

5. Secretary Mattis thereafter established a panel of experts to “conduct an independent multi-disciplinary review and study of relevant data and information pertaining to transgender Service members.” Karnoski Pet. App. 106a. The panel consisted of “senior uniformed and civilian Defense Department and U.S. Coast Guard leaders.” Id. at 205a. After “extensive review and deliberation,” the panel “exercised its professional military judgment” and presented its independent recommendations to the Secretary. Id. at 148a.

In February 2018, Secretary Mattis sent the President a memorandum proposing a new policy consistent with the panel’s conclusions, along with a lengthy report explaining the policy. Karnoski Pet. App. 113a-209a. Like the Carter policy, the Mattis policy holds that “transgender persons should not be disqualified from service solely on account of their transgender status.” Id. at 149a. And like the Carter policy, the Mattis policy draws distinctions on the basis of a medical condition (gender dysphoria) and related treatment (gender transition). Id. at 207a-208a. Under the Mattis policy -- as under the Carter policy -- transgender individuals without a history of gender dysphoria would be required to serve in their biological sex, whereas individuals with a history of gender dysphoria would be

presumptively disqualified from service. Ibid. The two policies, however, differ in their exceptions to that disqualification.

Under the Mattis accession standards, individuals with a history of gender dysphoria would be permitted to join the military if they have not undergone gender transition, are willing and able to serve in their biological sex, and can show 36 months of stability (i.e., the absence of gender dysphoria) before joining. Karnoski Pet. App. 123a. Under the Mattis retention standards, servicemembers who are diagnosed with gender dysphoria after entering service would be permitted to continue serving if they do not seek to undergo gender transition, are willing and able to serve in their biological sex, and are able to meet applicable deployability requirements. Id. at 123a-124a.

Under both the accession and the retention standards of the Mattis policy, individuals with gender dysphoria who have undergone gender transition or seek to do so would be ineligible to serve, unless they obtain a waiver. Karnoski Pet. App. 123a. The Mattis policy, however, contains a categorical reliance exemption for "transgender Service members who were diagnosed with gender dysphoria and either entered or remained in service following the announcement of the Carter policy." Id. at 200a. Under that exemption, those servicemembers "who were diagnosed with gender dysphoria by a military medical provider after the effective date of the Carter policy, but before the effective date of any new policy, may continue to receive all medically necessary

treatment * * * and to serve in their preferred gender, even after the new policy commences.” Ibid.; see C.A. E.R. 489.

6. In March 2018, the President issued a new memorandum “revok[ing]” his 2017 memorandum “and any other directive [he] may have made with respect to military service by transgender individuals.” Karnoski Pet. App. 211a. The 2018 memorandum recognized that the Mattis policy reflected “the exercise of [Secretary Mattis’s] independent judgment,” and it permitted the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security “to implement” that new policy. Id. at 210a-211a.

B. Procedural History

1. Shortly after the President issued his 2017 memorandum, respondents -- six current servicemembers, three individuals who seek to join the military, and three advocacy organizations -- brought suit in the Western District of Washington, challenging as a violation of equal protection, substantive due process, and the First Amendment what they described as “the Ban” on military service by transgender individuals reflected in the President’s 2017 tweets and memorandum. C.A. E.R. 118; see id. at 117-156. The State of Washington subsequently intervened in the suit as a plaintiff. Id. at 55-62, 108-116.

2. In December 2017, the district court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction, enjoining the military “from taking any action relative to transgender individuals that is inconsistent

with the status quo that existed prior to President Trump's July 26, 2017 announcement" on Twitter. App., infra, 23a.

The district court construed the President's 2017 tweets and memorandum as "unilaterally proclaim[ing] a prohibition on transgender service members." App., infra, 13a. The court determined that respondents were likely to succeed in challenging that prohibition on equal-protection, substantive-due-process, and First Amendment grounds. Id. at 15a. With respect to respondents' equal-protection claim, the court reasoned that the policy set forth in the President's 2017 memorandum "distinguish[ed] on the basis of transgender status, a quasi-suspect classification, and [wa]s therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny." Ibid. The court determined that the policy did not survive such scrutiny because its justifications were "contradicted by the studies, conclusions, and judgment of the military" in adopting the Carter policy. Id. at 16a (citation and emphasis omitted). With respect to respondent's substantive-due-process claim, the court determined that the President's policy "directly interfere[d]" with respondents' "fundamental right" to "define and express their gender identity" by "depriving them of employment and career opportunities." Id. at 19a. And with respect to respondents' First Amendment claim, the court determined that the President's policy was an impermissible "content-based restriction" that "penalize[d] transgender service members * * * for disclosing their gender identity." Id. at 19a-20a.

The district court subsequently clarified that maintaining the “status quo” under its injunction required implementing the Carter accession standards by January 1, 2018. App., infra, 26a. The government filed an appeal but dismissed it after the D.C. Circuit and the Fourth Circuit denied the government’s requests for partial stays of similar nationwide injunctions in related cases. See Doe 1 v. Trump, No. 17-5267, 2017 WL 6553389 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2017) (per curiam); Stone v. Trump, No. 17-2398, 2017 WL 9732004 (4th Cir. Dec. 21, 2017); 17-36009 C.A. Doc. 21, at 1 (Dec. 29, 2017). Absent stays of those injunctions, the military would have been forced to implement the Carter accession standards in any event. The government also expected that Secretary Mattis would soon be proposing a final policy that would render moot any appeal of the December 2017 injunction.

3. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the district court. See D. Ct. Doc. 129 (Jan. 25, 2018); D. Ct. Doc. 150 (Jan. 25, 2018); D. Ct. Doc. 194 (Feb. 28, 2018). Then, in March 2018, the government informed the court that the President had issued the new memorandum, which revoked his 2017 memorandum (and any similar directive) and allowed the military to adopt Secretary Mattis’s proposed policy. D. Ct. Doc. 223, at 3 (Mar. 29, 2018); see D. Ct. Doc. 213 (Mar. 23, 2018). In light of that new policy, the government moved to dissolve the December 2017 injunction. D. Ct. Doc. 223, at 1-27.

In April 2018, the district court ruled on the pending motions. App., infra, 30a-60a. The court struck the government's motion to dissolve, id. at 60a, and extended the injunction to enjoin the Mattis policy.⁵ The court characterized the Mattis policy as simply "a plan to implement" the "ban on military service by openly transgender people" that the President had supposedly announced in his 2017 tweets and memorandum. Id. at 31a; see id. at 32a n.1, 41. The court upheld respondents' standing to challenge that "Ban." Id. at 43a-49a. And despite having previously found "transgender people" to be "a quasi-suspect class," the court concluded that they are "a suspect class," id. at 49a, such that "[t]he Ban * * * must satisfy strict scrutiny if it is to survive," id. at 53a.

The district court declined, however, to grant in full respondents' motions for summary judgment. App., infra, 30a-31a. The court identified "an unresolved question of fact" regarding whether the "justifications for the Ban" found in the Mattis policy were entitled to "deference." Id. at 55a. The court stated that it could not determine, "[o]n the present record," "whether the [Department's] deliberative process -- including the timing and thoroughness of its study and the soundness of the medical and

⁵ The district court granted the government's cross-motion for summary judgment "with respect to injunctive relief against President Trump," but stated that "[t]he preliminary injunction previously entered otherwise remains in full force and effect." App., infra, 59a; see id. at 31a ("[T]he preliminary injunction will remain in effect.").

other evidence it relied upon -- is of the type to which Courts typically should defer." Ibid. The court also reasoned that "facts related to Defendants' deliberative process" would be necessary to determine "[w]hether Defendants have satisfied their burden of showing that the Ban is constitutionally adequate (i.e., that it was sincerely motivated by compelling state interests, rather than by prejudice or stereotype)." Id. at 57a. The court therefore directed the parties "to proceed with discovery and prepare for trial on the issues of whether, and to what extent, deference is owed to the Ban and whether the Ban violates equal protection, substantive due process, and the First Amendment." Id. at 60a.

4. The government promptly appealed and sought a stay of the preliminary injunction from the district court. Karnoski Pet. App. 73a-74a; D. Ct. Doc. 238 (Apr. 30, 2018). After the court rejected the government's request for an expedited ruling, D. Ct. Doc. 240, at 1 (May 2, 2018); see D. Ct. Doc. 238, at 6, the government filed a stay motion in the court of appeals, 18-35347 C.A. Doc. 3-1 (May 4, 2018).

For six weeks, neither court acted on the government's request for a stay. Then, in June 2018, more than two months after having extended the injunction, the district court denied the government's stay motion. App., infra, 61a-66a. After another month passed and the parties finished briefing the merits of the appeal on an expedited basis, see 9th Cir. R. 3-3, the court of

appeals likewise denied a stay, App., infra, 67a-68a, and notified the parties that it had scheduled oral argument in the case for October 2018, 18-35347 C.A. Doc. 92 (July 20, 2018).

The following business day, the government asked the court of appeals to expedite the date of oral argument. 18-35347 C.A. Doc. 93 (July 23, 2018). The government explained that “[e]xpedition is all the more necessary now that [the court] has denied the government’s motion for a stay pending appeal.” Id. at 4. The government urged the court to resolve the appeal as soon as possible because the injunction requires the military to maintain a policy that, in its own professional judgment, risks undermining readiness, disrupting unit cohesion, and weakening military effectiveness and lethality. Ibid. The government also emphasized that, absent expedition, it would “be difficult for the government, if it loses the appeal, to seek and obtain review during the Supreme Court’s 2018 Term.” Ibid.

The court of appeals denied the government’s request for expedition, 18-35347 C.A. Doc. 102 (Aug. 6, 2018), and heard oral argument on October 10, 2018, 18-35347 C.A. Docket entry No. 119 (Oct. 10, 2018). As of the date of this filing, the court has not issued a decision.⁶

⁶ On November 7, 2018, the government informed the court of appeals that, “in order to preserve th[is] Court’s ability to hear and decide the case this Term,” it intended to file a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment on November 23 if the court of appeals had not issued its judgment by then. 18-35347 C.A. Doc. 124, at 1-2.

5. Discovery continued in the district court after the government appealed the preliminary injunction. In July 2018, the court ordered the President to produce a detailed privilege log of presidential communications and make particularized objections of executive privilege on a document-by-document basis. D. Ct. Doc. 299, at 11 (July 27, 2018); see D. Ct. Doc. 311, at 1-10 (Aug. 20 2018). The court also ordered the wholesale disclosure of many thousands of documents withheld under the deliberative-process privilege. D. Ct. Doc. 299, at 11. On August 1, 2018, the government filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the court's order raised precisely the separation-of-powers concerns identified in Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367 (2004). The government's mandamus petition remains pending before the court of appeals, which has stayed the district court's order pending its disposition of the petition. See Karnoski Pet. 14 n.4.

ARGUMENT

In a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment filed in this Court on November 23, 2018, the government seeks review of the district court's nationwide preliminary injunction against the Mattis policy. For the reasons set forth in the petition, this Court should grant certiorari before judgment. If the Court declines to do so, however, the government respectfully requests, in the alternative, a stay of the injunction pending the resolution of the government's appeal in the court of appeals and any further

proceedings in this Court. At a minimum, the Court should stay the nationwide scope of the injunction pending those proceedings.

Under this Court's Rule 23 and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651, a single Justice or the Court has authority to enter a stay pending proceedings in a court of appeals.⁷ In considering an application for such a stay, the Court or Circuit Justice considers the likelihood of whether four Justices would vote to grant a writ of certiorari if the court of appeals ultimately rules against the applicant; whether five Justices would then conclude that the case was erroneously decided below; and whether, on balancing the equities, the injury asserted by the applicant outweighs the harm to the other parties or the public. See San Diegans for the Mt. Soledad Nat'l War Mem'l v. Paulson, 548 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2006) (Kennedy, J., in chambers); Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987) (traditional stay factors). All of those factors support a stay of the injunction or, at a minimum, its nationwide scope.

I. THIS COURT IS LIKELY TO GRANT REVIEW IF THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMS THE INJUNCTION AND ITS NATIONWIDE SCOPE

If the court of appeals affirms the district court's nationwide preliminary injunction against the Mattis policy, this Court is likely to grant review. Respondents challenge the constitutionality of the Mattis policy on equal-protection,

⁷ See, e.g., Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 542 (2017); West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016); Stephen M. Shapiro et al., Supreme Court Practice § 17.6, at 881-884 (10th ed. 2013).

substantive-due-process, and First Amendment grounds. Those challenges concern a matter of imperative public importance: the authority of the U.S. military to determine who may serve in the Nation's armed forces. After an extensive process of consultation and review involving senior military officials and other experts, the Secretary of Defense determined that individuals with a history of the medical condition gender dysphoria should be presumptively disqualified from military service, particularly if they have undergone the treatment of gender transition or seek to do so. See pp. 10-12, supra.

The district court in this case entered a nationwide preliminary injunction nullifying that exercise of professional military judgment and blocking the implementation of a policy that the Secretary has deemed necessary to "place the Department of Defense in the strongest position to protect the American people, to fight and win America's wars, and to ensure the survival and success of our Service members around the world." Karnoski Pet. App. 208a. If the court of appeals were to affirm the injunction, a judicial intrusion of that significance into the operation of our Nation's armed forces would warrant this Court's review. See Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 520 (1988) (granting certiorari to address interference with Executive Branch determinations that are of "importance * * * to national security concerns"); see also Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 12 (2008).

Leaving aside the merits of respondents' constitutional challenges, the issue of the appropriate remedy would itself present a question of exceptional importance warranting this Court's review. The district court in this case enjoined the implementation of the Mattis policy on a nationwide basis. The government has previously sought -- and this Court has previously granted -- review of whether a court of appeals erred in affirming the nationwide scope of an injunction entered by a district court. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018); Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009). If the court of appeals affirms the nationwide scope of the district court's injunction here, this Court's review would again be warranted.

That is particularly so because the nationwide relief ordered in this case extends a disturbing but accelerating trend among lower courts of issuing categorical injunctions designed to benefit nonparties. Lower courts, including the Ninth Circuit, once recognized that injunctions should be limited to redressing irreparable harm to the plaintiffs. See Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Def., 34 F.3d 1469, 1480 (9th Cir. 1994) (vacating a "nation-wide injunction" against the Department's policy on military service by gays and lesbians except to the extent that the injunction granted relief to the particular plaintiff before the court); see also, e.g., McKenzie v. City of Chicago, 118 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1997).

Those same courts and others, however, have since transformed a remedy that had been imposed in only a small number of cases into the norm. Thus, in a span of less than two years, district courts have issued 25 nationwide injunctions or temporary restraining orders against major policy decisions in areas including national defense, national security, immigration, and domestic policy. For example, district courts have issued nationwide injunctions against:

- the temporary suspension of entry into the United States of certain foreign nationals from select countries previously identified by prior Administrations or Congress as presenting a heightened risk of terrorism or other national-security concerns, in order to review screening and vetting procedures for foreign travelers;⁸
- entry restrictions on foreign nationals from select countries identified by a worldwide review as failing to provide information needed to adequately vet their

⁸ See Darweesh v. Trump, No. 17-cv-480, 2017 WL 388504 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017); Tootkaboni v. Trump, No. 17-cv-10154, 2017 WL 386550 (D. Mass. Jan. 29, 2017); Mohammed v. United States, No. 17-cv-786, 2017 WL 438750 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017); Washington v. Trump, No. 17-cv-141, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017); Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (D. Haw. 2017); International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md.), *aff'd in part, vacated in part*, 857 F. 3d 554 (4th Cir.), *vacated*, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017); Hawaii v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Haw.), *aff'd in part, vacated in part*, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir.), *vacated*, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017).

nationals or otherwise presenting heightened national-security risks;⁹

- conditions on federal grants to local governments to ensure that the Nation's immigration laws are faithfully executed;¹⁰
- exemptions to protect the sincerely held religious beliefs or moral convictions of certain entities whose health plans are subject to the mandate of contraceptive coverage under Affordable Care Act regulations;¹¹
- the rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), a discretionary policy of immigration enforcement adopted in 2012 as a temporary stop-gap measure permitting some 700,000 aliens to remain in the United

⁹ See Hawaii v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140 (D. Haw.), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017), rev'd, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570 (D. Md. 2017) (same), aff'd, 883 F.3d 233 (4th Cir.), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018).

¹⁰ See County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933 (N.D. Ill. 2017), aff'd, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (7th Cir. June 4), vacated, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268814 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (en banc); County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 897 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2018); City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sessions, No. 17-cv-4642, 2018 WL 4859528 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2018); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855 (N.D. Ill. 2018).

¹¹ See California v. Health & Human Servs., 281 F. Supp. 3d 806 (N.D. Cal. 2017).

States unlawfully while Congress considered a more permanent solution;¹²

- Executive Orders promoting efficiency and accountability in the federal civil service;¹³
- the termination of discretionary temporary protected status designations for four countries based on the Secretary of Homeland Security's determination that the extraordinary conditions that gave rise to the years-old (sometimes decades-old) "temporary" designations no longer persisted;¹⁴ and
- a rule addressing unlawful mass migration at the southern border and the massive recent increase in meritless asylum claims.¹⁵

¹² See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Department of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (N.D. Cal.), *aff'd*, 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. pending, No. 18-587 (filed Nov. 5, 2018); Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal pending, No. 18-485 (2d Cir. filed Feb. 20, 2018), petition for cert. before judgment pending, No. 18-589 (filed Nov. 5, 2018); see also Casa de Maryland v. Department of Homeland Sec., 284 F. Supp. 3d 758 (D. Md. 2018) (enjoining any change in the use of information provided by DACA recipients to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), despite DHS's public statements that no such change had been made).

¹³ See American Fed'n of Gov't Emps. v. Trump, 318 F. Supp. 3d 370 (D.D.C. 2018).

¹⁴ See Ramos v. Nielsen, No. 18-cv-1554, 2018 WL 4778285 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018).

¹⁵ See East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, No. 18-cv-6810, 2018 WL 6053140 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2018). On December 11, 2018, the Solicitor General filed an application in this Court for a stay

Equally troubling, several courts issuing these nationwide preliminary injunctions have also ordered massive and intrusive discovery into Executive-Branch decision-making, including, in a number of instances, blanket abrogations of the deliberative-process privilege. In this case, for example, the district court ordered the President to compile a detailed privilege log of presidential communications and the Executive Branch to produce many thousands of documents withheld under the deliberative-process privilege. D. Ct. Doc. 299, at 11. In other cases involving nationwide injunctions, the government has likewise been ordered to produce wide swaths of deliberative-process materials and, in one instance, "to include in the administrative record all * * * 'emails, letters, memoranda, notes, media items, opinions, and other materials'" considered by an acting Cabinet Secretary with respect to a particular policy. In re United States, 875 F.3d 1200, 1212 (9th Cir.) (Watford, J., dissenting), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 443 (2017); see, e.g., Order at 1-2, Ramos v. Nielsen, No. 18-cv-1554 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2018); Mem. Op. at 13-17, Stone v. Trump, No. 17-2459 (D. Md. Nov. 30, 2018).¹⁶

of the district court's nationwide injunction pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit. No. 18A615.

¹⁶ In still other suits against the government, which do not involve nationwide injunctions, intrusive discovery into Executive-Branch decision-making has likewise been ordered or is likely to be sought. See 7/3/18 Tr. at 82, New York v. United States Dep't of Commerce, No. 18-cv-2921 (S.D.N.Y.), mandamus denied, Nos. 18-2652, 18-2856 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, No. 18-557 (Nov. 16,

There is an additional concern for the Judiciary as well as the Executive. "Given the sweeping power of the individual judge to issue a national injunction, and the plaintiff's ability to select a forum," it raises the prospect that a plaintiff will engage in forum shopping, or that plaintiffs will file in multiple courts in the hope of obtaining a single favorable nationwide ruling. Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 460 (2017). Even if other district courts disagree, see, e.g., Sarsour v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 719 (E.D. Va. 2017) (declining to preliminarily enjoin the temporary suspension of entry into the United States of certain foreign nationals), so long as any court of appeals lets stand a single nationwide injunction -- which they largely have, with limited exceptions -- it prevents the implementation of Executive-Branch policies nationwide or even globally. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. pending, No. 18-587 (filed Nov. 5, 2018); International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2018), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018). But see City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1244 (9th Cir. 2018) (determining that the record was "not sufficient to support a nationwide injunction"); Order, City of Chicago v.

2018); Statement Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 26(f) at 4, District of Columbia v. Trump, No. 17-cv-1596 (D. Md. Sept. 14, 2018).

Sessions, No. 17-2991 (7th Cir. June 26, 2018) (staying nationwide scope of preliminary injunction).

Accordingly, if the court of appeals affirms the nationwide scope of the injunction here -- continuing this troubling and increasing trend in the lower courts -- that decision would warrant this Court's review. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2425 (Thomas, J., concurring); see id. at 2429 ("If federal courts continue to issue [universal injunctions], this Court is duty-bound to adjudicate their authority to do so."). Indeed, it is only this Court that can arrest this trend and address this rapidly expanding threat to the respect that each coordinate Branch of our Nation's government owes the others.

II. THERE IS AT LEAST A FAIR PROSPECT THAT THIS COURT WILL REVERSE IF THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMS THE INJUNCTION AND ITS NATIONWIDE SCOPE

There is also at least a "fair prospect," Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers), that if the court of appeals affirms the preliminary injunction and its nationwide scope, this Court will reverse.

A. As explained in the government's certiorari petition, respondents' equal-protection challenge to the Mattis policy lacks merit. See Karnoski Pet. 19-25. Under the Mattis policy, individuals may "not be disqualified from service solely on account of their transgender status." Karnoski Pet. App. 149a. Like the Carter policy before it, the Mattis policy turns on a medical condition (gender dysphoria) and related treatment (gender

transition) -- not any suspect or quasi-suspect classification. Id. at 92a, 121a-124a. Rational-basis review therefore applies, particularly given the military context in which the policy arises. And the Mattis policy satisfies that deferential review because it reflects, inter alia, the military's reasoned and considered judgment that "making accommodations for gender transition" would "not [be] conducive to, and would likely undermine, the inputs -- readiness, good order and discipline, sound leadership, and unit cohesion -- that are essential to military effectiveness and lethality." Id. at 197a. Respondents' substantive-due-process and First Amendment claims fare no better. See Karnoski Pet. 25.

B. Even if respondents could demonstrate a likelihood of success on their constitutional claims, there is a fair prospect that this Court would vacate the nationwide scope of the preliminary injunction. Nationwide injunctions like the one here transgress both Article III and longstanding equitable principles by affording relief that is not necessary to redress any cognizable, irreparable injury to the parties in the case. They also frustrate the development of the law, while obviating the requirements for and protections of class-action litigation.

1. a. Respondents lack Article III standing to seek injunctive relief beyond what is needed to redress an actual or imminent injury-in-fact to respondents themselves. "[S]tanding is not dispensed in gross," and "a plaintiff must demonstrate standing * * * for each form of relief that is sought." Town of Chester

v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1650 (2017) (citations omitted); see Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1933 (2018) (“The Court’s constitutionally prescribed role is to vindicate the individual rights of the people appearing before it.”). The remedy sought thus “must of course be limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established.” Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1931 (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996)). “The actual-injury requirement would hardly serve [its] purpose . . . of preventing courts from undertaking tasks assigned to the political branches, if once a plaintiff demonstrated harm from one particular inadequacy in government administration, the court were authorized to remedy all inadequacies in that administration.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 353 (2006) (brackets and citation omitted).

Applying that principle, this Court has invalidated injunctions that afforded relief that was not shown to be necessary to prevent cognizable injury to the plaintiff himself. For example, in Lewis, the Court held that an injunction directed at certain prison practices was overbroad, in violation of Article III, because it enjoined practices that had not been shown to injure any plaintiff. 518 U.S. at 358. The injunction “mandated sweeping changes” in various aspects of prison administration designed to improve prisoners’ access to legal services, including library hours, lockdown procedures, access to research facilities and training, and “‘direct assistance’” from lawyers and legal

support staff for "illiterate and non-English-speaking inmates." Id. at 347-348 (citation omitted).

This Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to seek, and the district court thus lacked authority to grant, such broad relief. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 358-360. The district court had "found actual injury on the part of only one named plaintiff," who claimed that a legal action he had filed was dismissed with prejudice as a result of his illiteracy and who sought assistance in filing legal claims. Id. at 358. "At the outset, therefore," this Court held that "[it] c[ould] eliminate from the proper scope of the injunction provisions directed at" the other claimed inadequacies that allegedly harmed "the inmate population at large." Ibid. "If inadequacies of th[at] character exist[ed]," the Court explained, "they ha[d] not been found to have harmed any plaintiff in this lawsuit, and hence were not the proper object of this District Court's remediation." Ibid.

Here, respondents likewise lack standing to seek an injunction that goes beyond redressing any harm to respondents themselves. Even if the nine individual respondents who are currently serving in the military or seeking to join it -- namely, Karnoski, Schmid, D. L., Muller, Lewis, Stephens, Winters, Doe, and Callahan -- could show that they would suffer cognizable, irreparable injuries from the implementation of the Mattis policy, those injuries would be fully redressed by an injunction limited to them. An injunction so limited would also fully redress any purported injuries to the

other respondents in this case. Even assuming that the State of Washington has Article III standing at all, it has not identified anyone beyond the individual respondents named above whose disqualification from military service would even arguably irreparably injure it. See C.A. E.R. 119 (first amended complaint alleging that three individual respondents -- Karnoski, Schmid, and Lewis -- are residents of the State of Washington); id. at 513, 530, 536 (declarations asserting the same). Similarly, the three advocacy organizations -- Human Rights Campaign, Gender Justice League, and American Military Partner Association -- have not identified any members beyond the individual respondents named above who would even arguably suffer an irreparable injury. See Karnoski Pet. App. 56a-57a (determining that the organizations have standing only because particular individual respondents who are members have standing).

b. This Court also has recognized and applied the corollary principle that, where a plaintiff faces actual or imminent injury at the outset of a suit but that injury is subsequently redressed or otherwise becomes moot, the plaintiff no longer can seek injunctive relief to redress alleged harms to anyone else. For example, in Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87 (2009), the Court held that the plaintiffs' challenge to a state-law procedure for disputing the seizure of vehicles or money had become moot because their "underlying property disputes" with the State "ha[d] all ended": the cars that had been seized from the plaintiffs had been

returned, and the plaintiffs had either forfeited the money seized or had "accepted as final the State's return of some of it." Id. at 89; see id. at 92. The Court accordingly held that the plaintiffs could no longer seek declaratory or injunctive relief against the State's policy. Id. at 92. Although the plaintiffs had "sought certification of a class," class certification had been denied, and that denial was not appealed. Ibid. "Hence the only disputes relevant" in this Court were "those between th[ose] six plaintiffs" and the State concerning specific seized property, "and those disputes [were] * * * over." Id. at 93. And although the plaintiffs "continue[d] to dispute the lawfulness of the State's hearing procedures," their "dispute [wa]s no longer embedded in any actual controversy about the plaintiffs' particular legal rights." Ibid.

Similarly, in Earth Island, the Court held that a plaintiff lacked standing to seek to enjoin certain Forest Service regulations after the parties had resolved the controversy regarding the application of those regulations to the specific project that had caused that plaintiff's own claimed injury. 555 U.S. at 494-497. The plaintiff's "injury in fact with regard to that project," the Court held, "ha[d] been remedied," and so he lacked standing to maintain his challenge to the regulations. Id. at 494. The Court expressly rejected a contrary rule that, "when a plaintiff has sued to challenge the lawfulness of certain action or threatened action but has settled that suit, he retains standing to challenge the basis for that action" -- in Earth

Island, "the regulation in the abstract" -- "apart from any concrete application that threatens imminent harm to his interests." Ibid. Such a rule would "fly in the face of Article III's injury-in-fact requirement." Ibid.

The same conclusion logically follows where, as here, a plaintiff's only injury would be eliminated by an injunction barring application of the challenged policy to the plaintiff. If a plaintiff himself is no longer in any imminent danger of suffering injury from the policy -- whether because his injury has become moot, as in Alvarez and Earth Island, or because a plaintiff-specific injunction prevents any future injury to that plaintiff from the policy -- he lacks standing to press for additional injunctive relief. The fact that the challenged policy could still cause concrete injury to nonparties is irrelevant. As Alvarez and Earth Island both demonstrate, the plaintiff must show the relief he seeks is necessary to redress his own actual or imminent injury-in-fact; potential injuries to others do not entitle the plaintiff to seek relief on their behalf.

2. Independent of Article III, the nationwide preliminary injunction here violates fundamental rules of equity by granting relief broader than necessary to prevent irreparable harm to respondents. This Court has long recognized that injunctive relief must "be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs." Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (citation omitted).

Where no class has been certified, a plaintiff must show that the requested relief is necessary to redress the plaintiff's own irreparable harm; the plaintiff cannot seek injunctive relief in order to prevent harm to others. See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 163 (2010) (plaintiffs "d[id] not represent a class, so they could not seek to enjoin [an agency order] on the ground that it might cause harm to other parties"). Even where a class has been certified, relief is limited to what is necessary to redress irreparable injury to members of that class. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 359-360, 360 n.7.

History confirms that the injunction in this case violates "traditional principles of equity jurisdiction." Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 319 (1999) (citation omitted). This Court "ha[s] long held that the jurisdiction" conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789 "over 'all suits . . . in equity' * * * is an authority to administer in equity suits the principles of the system of judicial remedies which had been devised and was being administered by the English Court of Chancery at the time of the separation of the two countries." Id. at 318 (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). Absent a specific statutory provision providing otherwise, then, "the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts is the jurisdiction in equity exercised by the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the enactment of the original Judiciary Act, 1789." Ibid. (citation omitted).

Absent-party injunctions were not “traditionally accorded by courts of equity.” Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 319. Indeed, they did not exist at equity at all. See Bray 424-445 (detailing historical practice). Thus, in the late 19th century, this Court rejected injunctive relief that barred enforcement of a law to nonparties. Bray 429 (discussing Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897)). As a consequence, for example, in the 1930s courts issued more than 1600 injunctions against enforcement of a single federal statute. Bray 434. The nationwide injunction in this case is thus inconsistent with “longstanding limits on equitable relief.” Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2425 (Thomas, J., concurring).

3. Nationwide injunctions like the one here also disserve this Court’s interest in allowing an issue to percolate in the lower courts. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984). While other suits may proceed even after a nationwide injunction is issued, the moment the first nationwide injunction on a question is affirmed by a court of appeals, this Court is forced to either grant review or risk losing the opportunity for review altogether; there may be no second case if it denies review in the first, because other plaintiffs may simply drop their suits and rely on the first nationwide injunction. Permitting such nationwide injunctions also undercuts the primary mechanism Congress has authorized to permit broader relief: class actions. It enables all potential claimants to benefit from nationwide injunctive relief by prevailing in a single district court, without

satisfying the prerequisites of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, while denying the government the corresponding benefit of a definitive resolution as to all potential claimants if it prevails instead. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974). In other words, if plaintiffs file multiple suits against a government policy, they collectively need to win only a single suit for them all to prevail, while the government must run the table to enforce its policy.

4. Finally, nationwide preliminary injunctions (and the oft-accompanying discovery orders) deeply intrude into the separated powers upon which our national government is based. Under those principles, the political Branches are charged with making national policies, including and especially with regard to the national defense. The Judicial Branch, in contrast, is charged with resolving specific cases and controversies -- and in particular, redressing concrete injuries to specific parties when the policies adopted by the political Branches transgress legal limits. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) ("The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion."). The types of unrestrained orders that have, in recent years, transformed from rare exceptions into routine interim remedies risk undermining, if not reversing, this fundamental constitutional order -- ultimately, to the long-term detriment of all Branches of

our national government. This Court's intervention is therefore both necessary and appropriate.

III. THE BALANCE OF EQUITIES STRONGLY SUPPORTS A STAY OF THE INJUNCTION IN ITS ENTIRETY OR AT LEAST OF ITS NATIONWIDE SCOPE

The nationwide preliminary injunction in this case causes direct, irreparable injury to the interests of the government and the public, which merge here. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). It does so by forcing the Department to maintain a policy that it has determined poses "substantial risks" and threatens to "undermine readiness, disrupt unit cohesion, and impose an unreasonable burden on the military that is not conducive to military effectiveness and lethality." Karnoski Pet. App. 206a; cf. King, 567 U.S. at 1303 (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) ("[A]ny time a State is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury.") (brackets in original) (quoting New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1351 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers)). Given this severe harm to the federal government -- which far outweighs respondents' speculative claims of injury, see Gov't C.A. Br. 49-53, Gov't C.A. Reply Br. 23-26 -- the Court should stay the injunction in its entirety.

At a minimum, the Court should stay the nationwide scope of the injunction, such that the injunction bars the implementation of the Mattis policy only as to Karnoski, Schmid, D. L., Muller, Lewis, Stephens, Winters, Doe, and Callahan. The Court granted

just such a stay in Meinhold. In that case, a discharged Navy servicemember brought a facial constitutional challenge against the Department's "then-existing policy regarding homosexuals." Meinhold, 34 F.3d at 1473. After the district court enjoined the Department from "taking any actions against gay or lesbian servicemembers based on their sexual orientation" nationwide, this Court stayed that order "to the extent it conferred relief on persons other than Meinhold." Ibid.; see Meinhold, 510 U.S. at 939.

The Court should follow the same course here. Indeed, this case and others involving constitutional challenges to the Mattis policy illustrate the distinct harms to the government from nationwide injunctions. The government is currently subject to four different nationwide preliminary injunctions, each requiring the government to maintain the Carter accession and retention standards. Even if the government were to prevail in the Ninth Circuit -- which has before it two of these injunctions (in this case and in Stockman v. Trump, No. 18-56539) -- the government would still need to proceed with its appeal before the D.C. Circuit, see Doe 2 v. Trump, No. 18-5257. And even then, the government would still be subject to a fourth nationwide preliminary injunction, issued by the district court in Maryland. See Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747 (D. Md. 2017). Although the government moved nine months ago to dissolve that injunction in light of the new Mattis policy, see Gov't Mot. to Dissolve the Prelim. Inj., Stone, supra

(No. 17-cv-2459) (Mar. 23, 2018), the district court in Maryland has not ruled on the government's pending motion.

Given the injunctions' nationwide scope, the government would have to succeed in vacating all four before it could begin implementing the Mattis policy. So long as even a single injunction remains in place, the military will be forced to maintain nationwide a policy that it has concluded is contrary to "readiness, good order and discipline, sound leadership, and unit cohesion," which "are essential to military effectiveness and lethality." Karnoski Pet. App. 197a; see id. at 202a (explaining that the "risks" associated with the Carter policy should not be incurred "given the Department's grave responsibility to fight and win the Nation's wars in a manner that maximizes the effectiveness, lethality, and survivability" of servicemembers).

By contrast, respondents will suffer no injury -- let alone irreparable injury -- if the nationwide scope of the injunction is stayed pending the resolution of the government's appeal and any further proceedings in this Court. That is because the injunction would still bar the implementation of the Mattis policy as to the nine individual respondents who are currently serving in the military or seeking to join it, redressing any purported harm to respondents themselves. See pp. 30-31, supra.

The balance of equities therefore warrants, at a minimum, a stay of the nationwide scope of the injunction. In the absence of certiorari before judgment, such a stay would at least allow the

military to implement in part the Mattis policy -- a policy it has determined, after a thorough and independent review, to be in the Nation's best interests -- while litigation continues through 2019 and into 2020.¹⁷

CONCLUSION

If the petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment is denied, the injunction should be stayed in its entirety pending the disposition of the appeal in the court of appeals and, if that court affirms the injunction, pending the filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari and any further proceedings in this Court. At a minimum, the Court should stay the nationwide scope of the injunction, such that the injunction bars the implementation of the Mattis policy only as to the nine individual respondents in this case who are currently serving in the military or seeking to join it.

Respectfully submitted.

NOEL J. FRANCISCO
Solicitor General

DECEMBER 2018

¹⁷ In applications filed simultaneously with this one, the government also seeks, as an alternative to certiorari before judgment, stays of the preliminary injunctions (or, at a minimum, their nationwide scope) in Doe and Stockman. If this Court were to stay the injunctions in these cases in whole or in part, that decision would be binding precedent on the application of the stay factors to such an injunction and would therefore require the district court to similarly stay the injunction in Stone.

APPENDIX

District court order granting preliminary injunction (Dec. 11, 2017)	1a
District court order denying motion for clarification (Dec. 29, 2017)	24a
District court order striking motion to dissolve preliminary injunction (Apr. 13, 2018)	30a
District court order denying stay (June 15, 2018).....	61a
Court of appeals order denying stay (July 18, 2018).....	67a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

RYAN KARNOSKI, et al.

Plaintiffs,

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.

Defendants.

CASE NO. C17-1297-MJP

ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISMISS

ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

INTRODUCTION

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Ryan Karnoski, et al.'s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. No. 32) and Defendants Donald J. Trump, et al.'s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 69). Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Defendant President Donald J. Trump's Presidential Memorandum excluding transgender individuals from the military. Defendants respond that Plaintiffs lack standing, that their claims are neither properly plead nor ripe for review, and that they are not entitled to injunctive relief. Having reviewed the Motions (Dkt. Nos. 32, 69), the Responses (Dkt. Nos. 69, 84), the Replies (Dkt. Nos. 84, 90), and all related papers, and having considered the arguments made in proceedings before the Court, the

1 Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and GRANTS
2 Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

3 **ORDER SUMMARY**

4 On July 26, 2017, President Donald J. Trump announced on Twitter that "the United
5 States Government will not accept or allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in
6 the U.S. Military." A Presidential Memorandum followed, directing the Secretaries of Defense
7 and Homeland Security to "return" to the military's policy authorizing the discharge of openly
8 transgender service members (the "Retention Directive"); to prohibit the accession (bringing into
9 service) of openly transgender individuals (the "Accession Directive"); and to prohibit the
10 funding of certain surgical procedures for transgender service members (the "Medical Care
11 Directive"). Plaintiffs filed this action challenging the constitutionality of the policy prohibiting
12 military service by openly transgender individuals. Plaintiffs contend the policy violates their
13 equal protection and due process rights and their rights under the First Amendment. Plaintiffs
14 include transgender individuals currently serving in the military and seeking to join the military;
15 the Human Rights Campaign, the Gender Justice League, and the American Military Partner
16 Association; and the State of Washington. Plaintiffs have moved for a preliminary injunction to
17 prevent implementation of the policy set forth in the Presidential Memorandum, and Defendants
18 have moved to dismiss.

19 The Court finds that Plaintiffs have standing to bring this action, and that their claims for
20 violation of equal protection, substantive due process, and the First Amendment are properly
21 plead and ripe for resolution. The Court finds that Plaintiffs' claim for violation of procedural
22 due process is defective. The Court finds that the policy prohibiting openly transgender
23 individuals from serving in the military is likely unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Court
24

GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

BACKGROUND

I. Presidential Memorandum and Interim Guidance

On July 26, 2017, President Donald J. Trump announced on Twitter that the United States government will no longer allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the military. (Dkt. No. 34, Ex. 6.) President Trump's announcement read as follows:



Thereafter, President Trump issued a memorandum (the "Presidential Memorandum") directing the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security to "return" to the military's policy authorizing the discharge of openly transgender service members (the "Retention Directive"); to prohibit the accession (bringing into service) of openly transgender individuals (the "Accession Directive"); and to prohibit the funding of certain surgical procedures for transgender service members (the "Medical Care Directive"). (*Id.* at §§ 1-3.) The Accession Directive takes effect on January 1, 2018; the Retention and Medical Care Directives take effect on March 23, 2018. (*Id.* at § 3.)

1 On September 14, 2017, Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis issued a memorandum
2 providing interim guidance to the military (the “Interim Guidance”). (Dkt. No. 69, Ex. 1.) The
3 Interim Guidance identified the intent of the Department of Defense (“DoD”) to “carry out the
4 President’s policy and directives” and to identify “a plan to implement the policy and directives
5 in the Presidential Memorandum.” (*Id.* at 2.) The Interim Guidance explained that transgender
6 individuals would be prohibited from accession effective immediately. (*Id.* at 3.)

7 **II. Policy on Transgender Service Members Prior to July 26, 2017**

8 Prior to President Trump’s announcement, the military concluded that transgender
9 individuals should be permitted to serve openly and was in the process of implementing a policy
10 to this effect (the “June 2016 Policy”). (Dkt. Nos. 32 at 9-10; 46 at ¶¶ 8-27; 48 at ¶¶ 8-36, Ex.
11 C.) The June 2016 Policy was preceded by extensive research, including an independent study
12 to evaluate the implications of military service by transgender individuals. (Dkt. Nos. 30 at
13 ¶¶ 159-162; 32 at 9-10; 46 at ¶ 11.) This study concluded that allowing transgender individuals
14 to serve would not negatively impact military effectiveness, readiness, or unit cohesion, and that
15 the costs of providing transgender service members with transition-related healthcare would be
16 “exceedingly small” compared with DoD’s overall healthcare expenditures. (Dkt. No. 32 at 30;
17 46 at ¶¶ 15-20.) After consulting with medical experts, personnel experts, readiness experts,
18 commanders whose units included transgender service members, and others, the working group
19 concluded that transgender individuals should be allowed to serve openly. (Dkt. Nos. 30 at
20 ¶ 161; 46 at ¶ 10.) The Secretary of Defense issued a directive-type memorandum on June 30,
21 2016 affirming that “service in the United States military should be open to all who can meet the
22 rigorous standards for military service and readiness,” including transgender individuals. (Dkt.
23 No. 48, Ex. C.) The memorandum established procedures for accession, retention, in-service
24

1 transition, and medical coverage, and provided that “[e]ffective immediately, no otherwise
2 qualified Service member may be involuntarily separated, discharged or denied reenlistment or
3 continuation of service, solely on the basis of their gender identity.” (*Id.*) Relying upon the June
4 2016 Policy, transgender service members disclosed their transgender status to the military and
5 were serving openly at the time of President Trump’s announcement. (*See* Dkt. Nos. 30 at ¶¶
6 101-102, 112-114; 48 at ¶ 37.)

7 **III. Plaintiffs Challenge to the Presidential Memorandum**

8 Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the policy prohibiting military service by
9 openly transgender individuals and seek declaratory and injunctive relief.¹ (Dkt. No. 30 at 39.)
10 Plaintiffs contend the policy violates their equal protection and due process rights, and their
11 rights under the First Amendment. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 214-238.)

12 Plaintiffs include nine individuals (the “Individual Plaintiffs”), three organizations (the
13 “Organizational Plaintiffs”), and Washington State. (*See id.* at ¶¶ 7-18; Dkt. No. 101.)
14 Plaintiffs Ryan Karnoski, D.L., and Connor Callahan seek to pursue a military career, and
15 contend that the policy set forth in the Presidential Memorandum forecloses this opportunity.
16 (Dkt. No. 30 at ¶¶ 38-49, 64-73, 130-139.) Plaintiffs Staff Sergeant Cathrine Schmid, Chief
17 Warrant Officer Lindsey Muller, Petty Officer First Class Terece Lewis, Petty Officer Second
18 Class Phillip Stephens, and Petty Officer Second Class Megan Winters currently serve openly
19 in the military. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 50-63, 74-120.) Plaintiff Jane Doe currently serves in the military, but
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21 ¹ Plaintiffs’ suit is one of four lawsuits filed in response to President Trump’s policy prohibiting
22 transgender individuals from serving openly. *See Doe 1 v. Trump*, No. 17-1597 (CKK) (D.D.C.
23 filed Aug. 9, 2017); *Stone v. Trump*, No. MJG-17-2459 (D. Md. filed Aug. 8, 2017); *Stockman*
24 *v. Trump*, No. 17-cv-1799-JGB-KK (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 5, 2017). The District Courts for the
Districts of Columbia and Maryland have issued preliminary injunctions suspending enforcement
of the policy. *See Doe 1*, 2017 WL 4873042 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2017); *Stone*, 2017 WL 5589122
(D. Md. Nov. 21, 2017).

1 does not serve openly. (Id. at ¶¶ 121-129.) The Human Rights Campaign (“HRC”), the Gender
2 Justice League (“GJL”), and the American Military Partner Association (“AMPA”) join as
3 Organizational Plaintiffs. (Id. at ¶¶ 140-145.) After the Individual and Organization Plaintiffs
4 filed this action, Washington State moved to intervene to protect its sovereign and quasi-
5 sovereign interests, which it alleged were harmed by the policy set forth in the Presidential
6 Memorandum. (Dkt. No. 55; see also Dkt. No. 97.) On November 27, 2017, the Court granted
7 Washington State’s motion. (Dkt. No. 101.) Washington State now joins in Plaintiffs’ Motion
8 for Preliminary Injunction based upon its interests in protecting “the health, and physical and
9 economic well-being of its residents” and “securing residents from the harmful effects of
10 discrimination.” (Id. at 4.) Defendants include President Donald J. Trump, Secretary James N.
11 Mattis, the United States, and the DoD. (Dkt. No. 30 at ¶¶ 19-22.)

12 DISCUSSION

13 I. Motion to Dismiss

14 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil
15 Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (See Dkt. No. 69 at 16-22.) The Court finds that Plaintiffs
16 have standing to challenge the Presidential Memorandum and have stated valid claims upon
17 which relief may be granted. However, Plaintiffs have failed to state a valid claim for violation
18 of procedural due process. The Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to
19 Plaintiffs’ equal protection, substantive due process, and First Amendment claims; and GRANTS
20 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim.

21 A. Rule 12(b)(1)

22 Defendants move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of
23 Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Defendants contend the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction for two
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1 reasons: First, they contend Plaintiffs lack standing because they have not suffered injuries in
2 fact. (*Id.* at 18-20.) Second, they contend Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe for resolution. (*Id.* at
3 20-22.) Plaintiffs respond that the Presidential Memorandum gives rise to current harm and
4 credible threats of impending harm sufficient for both standing and ripeness. (*See* Dkt. No. 84 at
5 11-27.)

6 **i. *Individual Plaintiffs***

7 The Court finds that the Individual Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Presidential
8 Memorandum. To establish standing, Individual Plaintiffs must demonstrate: (1) an “injury in
9 fact”; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) that it
10 is likely their injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*,
11 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). “At the preliminary injunction stage, a plaintiff must make a
12 ‘clear showing’ of his injury in fact.” *Lopez v. Candaele*, 630 F.3d 775, 785 (9th Cir. 2010)
13 (quoting *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)). An “injury in fact”
14 exists where there is an invasion of a legally protected interest that is both “concrete and
15 particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at
16 560 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

17 Each of the Individual Plaintiffs satisfies these requirements: As a result of the
18 Retention Directive, Plaintiffs Schmid, Muller, Lewis, Stephens, Winters, and Doe face a
19 credible threat of discharge. (*See* Dkt. No. 84 at 14-15.) As a result of the Accession
20 Directive, Plaintiff Schmid has been refused consideration for appointment as a warrant officer
21 and faces a credible threat of being denied opportunities for career advancement. (*See* Dkt.
22 Nos. 36 at ¶¶ 28-30; 70 at ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs Karnoski, D.L., and Callahan also face a credible
23 threat of being denied opportunities to compete for accession on equal footing with non-
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1 transgender individuals. (See Dkt. Nos. 35 at ¶¶ 16-22; 37 at ¶¶ 3-16; 42 at ¶¶ 3-5, 10-21; see
2 also Doe 1, 2017 WL 4873042, at *18-19 (finding the Accession and Retention Directives
3 impose competitive barriers on transgender individuals who intend to accede). As a result of
4 the Medical Care Directive, Plaintiff Stephens faces a credible threat of being denied surgical
5 treatment, as he is currently ineligible for surgery until after March 23, 2018, the date upon
6 which DoD is to cease funding of transition-related surgical procedures.² (Dkt. Nos. 30 at ¶
7 102; 34, Ex. 7 at § 3; 40 at ¶ 14.)

8 In addition to these threatened harms, the Individual Plaintiffs face current harms in the
9 form of stigmatization and impairment of free expression. The policy set forth in the Presidential
10 Memorandum currently denies Individual Plaintiffs the opportunity to serve in the military on
11 the same terms as other service members, deprives them of dignity, and subjects them to
12 stigmatization. (Dkt. No. 30 at ¶¶ 217, 222, 238.) Policies that “stigmatiz[e] members of the
13 disfavored group as ‘innately inferior’ . . . can cause serious non-economic injuries to those
14 persons who are personally denied equal treatment solely because of their membership in a
15 disfavored group.” Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 737-740 (1984). The Presidential
16 Memorandum currently impairs Plaintiff Jane Doe’s rights to express her authentic gender
17 identity, as she fears discharge from the military as a result. (Dkt. No. 33 at ¶¶ 3-15.) Plaintiff
18 Doe’s self-censorship is a “constitutionally sufficient injury,” as it is based on her “actual and
19 well-founded fear” that the Retention Directive will take effect. See Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc.
20 v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (“an actual and well-founded fear that [a] law

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22 ² While the Medical Care Directive includes an exception where necessary “to protect the health
23 of an individual who has already begun a course of treatment to reassign his or her sex” (Dkt.
24 No. 34, Ex. 7 at § 2), the exception does not apply to Plaintiff Stephens and does not diminish
the threat of harm he faces. (Dkt. No. 40 at ¶ 14.)

1 will be enforced against [him or her]” may create standing to bring pre-enforcement claims based
2 on the First Amendment) (quoting Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 393
3 (1988)).

4 Each of Defendants’ arguments to the contrary is unavailing. First, Defendants claim the
5 harms facing Plaintiffs are not certain, as the Presidential Memorandum directs “further study
6 before the military changes its longstanding policies regarding service by transgender
7 individuals.” (See Dkt. No. 69 at 18.) However, the Accession Directive is already in place, and
8 the restrictions set forth in the Medical Care Directive are final and will be implemented on
9 March 23, 2018. (See Dkt. No. 34, Ex. 7 at § 3.) The Court finds that “[t]he directives of the
10 Presidential Memorandum, to the extent they are definitive, are the operative policy toward
11 military service by transgender service members.” Doe 1, 2017 WL 4873042, at *17. Similarly,
12 the Court reads the Interim Guidance “as implementing the directives of the Presidential
13 Memorandum,” and concludes that “any protections afforded by the Interim Guidance are
14 necessarily limited to the extent they conflict with the express directives of the memorandum.”
15 Id.

16 Second, Defendants claim Plaintiffs Karnoski, D.L., and Callahan have not suffered
17 injury in fact as they have yet to enlist in the military. (Dkt. No. 69 at 19.) However, as a result
18 of the Accession Directive, Plaintiffs Karnoski, D.L., and Callahan cannot compete for accession
19 on equal footing with non-transgender individuals. Denial of this opportunity constitutes injury
20 in fact. See Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365-66 (1977)
21 (“When a person's desire for a job is not translated into a formal application solely because of his
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1 unwillingness to engage in a futile gesture he is as much a victim of discrimination as is he who
2 goes through the motions of submitting an application.”).³

3 Third, Defendants rely on Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) to claim that Plaintiffs
4 have not suffered stigmatic injury. (Dkt. No. 69 at 18.) But unlike the claimants in Allen, who
5 raised abstract instances of stigmatic injury only, the Individual Plaintiffs have identified
6 concrete interests in accession, career advancement, and medical treatment, and have
7 demonstrated that they are “‘personally denied equal treatment’ by the challenged discriminatory
8 conduct.” Allen, 468 U.S. at 755 (quoting Heckler, 465 U.S. at 739-40). Such stigmatic injury
9 is “one of the most serious consequences of discriminatory government action and is sufficient in
10 some circumstances to support standing.” Id.⁴

11 **ii. Organizational Plaintiffs**

12 The Court finds that Organizational Plaintiffs HRC, GJL, and AMPA have standing to
13 challenge the Presidential Memorandum. An organization has standing where “(a) its members
14 would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are
15 germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested
16 requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Wash. State Apple
17 Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). Each of the Organizational Plaintiffs satisfies these
18 requirements. Individual Plaintiffs Karnoski and Schmid are members of HRC, GJL, and

19 ³ Defendants’ claim that Plaintiffs Karnoski and D.L. would not be able to accede under the June
20 2016 Policy because they have recently taken steps to transition does not compel a different
21 finding. Plaintiffs’ injury “lies in the denial of an equal *opportunity* to compete, not the denial of
22 the job itself,” and thus the Court does not “inquire into the plaintiffs’ qualifications (or lack
thereof) when assessing standing.” Shea v. Kerry, 796 F.3d 42, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280-81 & n.14 (1978) (emphasis in original)).

23 ⁴ Allen addressed racial discrimination specifically. However, the Supreme Court has also
24 acknowledged stigmatic injury arising from gender-based discrimination. See Heckler, 465 U.S.
at 737-40.

1 AMPA, and Individual Plaintiffs Muller, Stephens, and Winters are also members of AMPA.
2 (See Dkt. No. 30 at ¶¶ 141-145.) The interests each Organizational Plaintiff seeks to protect are
3 germane to their organizational purposes, which include ending discrimination against LGBTQ
4 individuals (HRC and GJL) and supporting families and allies of LGBT service members and
5 veterans (AMPA). (Id. at ¶¶ 16-18.) As Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief,
6 participation by the organizations' individual members is not required. See Associated Gen.
7 Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Coal. for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir. 1991)
8 (participation of individual members not required where "the claims proffered and relief
9 requested [by an organization] do not demand individualized proof on the part of its members").

10 **iii. *Washington State***

11 The Court finds that Washington State has standing to challenge the Presidential
12 Memorandum. A state has standing to sue the federal government to vindicate its sovereign and
13 quasi-sovereign interests. See Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 518-520 (2007).
14 Sovereign interests include a state's interest in protecting the natural resources within its
15 boundaries. Id. at 518-519. Quasi-sovereign interests include a state's interest in the health and
16 physical and economic well-being of its residents, and in "securing residents from the harmful
17 effects of discrimination." Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Barez, 458 U.S.
18 592, 607, 609 (1982). Washington State is home to approximately 45,000 active duty service
19 members and approximately 32,850 transgender adults. (Dkt. No. 97 at 6.) The Washington
20 National Guard is comprised of service members who assist with emergency preparedness and
21 disaster recovery planning, including protecting Washington State's natural resources from
22 wildfires, landslides, flooding, and earthquakes. (Id. at 8.) Washington State contends that
23 prohibiting transgender individuals from serving openly adversely impacts its ability to recruit
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1 and retain members of the Washington National Guard, and thereby impairs its ability to protect
2 its territory and natural resources. (Id.) Additionally, Washington State contends that the
3 prohibition implicates its interest in maintaining and enforcing its anti-discrimination laws,
4 protecting its residents from discrimination, and ensuring that employment and advancement
5 opportunities are not unlawfully restricted based on transgender status. (Id. at 8-9.) The Court
6 agrees.

7 The injuries to the Individual Plaintiffs, the Organizational Plaintiffs, and to Washington
8 State are indisputably traceable to the policy set forth in the Presidential Memorandum, and may
9 be redressed by a favorable ruling from this Court. Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants'
10 Motion to Dismiss for lack of standing.

11 **iv. *Ripeness***

12 The Court finds that Plaintiffs' claims are ripe for review. Ripeness "ensure[s] that
13 courts adjudicate live cases or controversies" and do not "issue advisory opinions [or] declare
14 rights in hypothetical cases." Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Inyo Cnty., 863 F.3d 1144, 1153 (9th Cir.
15 2017) (citation omitted). "A proper ripeness inquiry contains a constitutional and a prudential
16 component." Id. (citation omitted). Because Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the
17 Presidential Memorandum, their claims satisfy the requirement for constitutional ripeness. See
18 id. (constitutional ripeness "is often treated under the rubric of standing"). Because they raise
19 purely legal issues (i.e., whether the Presidential Memorandum violates their constitutional
20 rights), and because withholding consideration of these issues will subject Plaintiffs to hardships
21 (i.e., denial of career opportunities and transition-related medical care, stigmatic injury, and
22 impairment of self-expression), they also satisfy the requirement for prudential ripeness. See id.
23 at 1154 (prudential ripeness is "guided by two overarching considerations: the fitness of the
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1 issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.”)
2 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

3 Defendants claim this case is not ripe for resolution because the policy on military service
4 by transgender individuals is “still being studied, developed, and implemented.” (Dkt. No. 69 at
5 20.) However, President Trump’s announcement on Twitter and his Presidential Memorandum
6 did not order a study, but instead unilaterally proclaimed a prohibition on transgender service
7 members. See Stone, 2017 WL 5589122, at *10 (“The Court cannot interpret the plain text of
8 the President’s Memorandum as being a request for a study to determine whether or not the
9 directives should be implemented. Rather, it orders the directives to be implemented by
10 specified dates.”). Defendants’ contention that Plaintiffs must first exhaust administrative
11 remedies before the Court can consider their claims is also unavailing, as the Ninth Circuit has
12 explained that “[r]esolving a claim founded solely upon a constitutional right is singularly suited
13 to a judicial forum and clearly inappropriate to an administrative board.” Downen v. Warner,
14 481 F.2d 642, 643 (9th Cir. 1973).

15 Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter
16 jurisdiction.

17 **B. Rule 12(b)(6)**

18 To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
19 granted, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
20 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
21 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This requirement is met where the
22 complaint “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
23 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The complaint need not include detailed
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1 allegations, but it must have “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
2 elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In evaluating a motion
3 under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts all facts alleged in the complaint as true, and makes all
4 inferences in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Barker v. Riverside Cnty. Office of
5 Educ., 584 F.3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted).

6 The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint states valid claims for violation of
7 equal protection, substantive due process, and the First Amendment. Plaintiffs have established
8 a likelihood of success on the merits with regard to each of these claims (see discussion of
9 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, infra), and for the same reasons, these claims
10 survive under Rule 12(b)(6). However, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint fails
11 to state a valid claim for violation of procedural due process. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint
12 alleges neither a “protectible liberty or property interest” nor a “denial of adequate procedural
13 protections” as required for a procedural due process claim. (See Dkt. No. 30 at ¶¶ 225-230;
14 Sanchez v. City of Fresno, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1103 (9th Cir. 2012).) ⁵

15 Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs’
16 equal protection, substantive due process and First Amendment claims, and GRANTS
17 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim.

18 **II. Motion for Preliminary Injunction**

19 The Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction to preserve the
20 status quo that existed prior to the change in policy announced by President Trump on Twitter
21 and in his Presidential Memorandum. The Court considers four factors in evaluating Plaintiffs’
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23 ⁵ The Court notes that the procedural due process claim is elaborated upon in detail in Plaintiffs’
24 Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Reply. (See Dkt. Nos. 32 at 22-23; 84 at 39-40.)

1 request for a preliminary injunction: (1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the likelihood
2 of irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction; (3) the balance of equities; and (4) the public
3 interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. “When the government is a party, these last two factors
4 merge.” Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Nken v.
5 Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)).

6 **A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits**

7 The Court finds that Plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits of
8 their equal protection, substantive due process, and First Amendment claims.

9 **i. *Equal Protection***

10 Plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits of their equal protection
11 challenge. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits government action “denying to any person
12 the equal protection of the laws.” United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013).
13 Plaintiffs contend the policy set forth in the Presidential Memorandum denies them equal
14 protection in that it impermissibly classifies individuals based on transgender status and gender
15 identity and is not substantially related to an important government interest. (Dkt. No. 30 at
16 ¶¶ 217-224.)

17 The Court must first determine whether the policy burdens “a ‘suspect’ or ‘quasi-
18 suspect’ class.” See Ball v. Massanari, 254 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court
19 concludes that the policy distinguishes on the basis of transgender status, a quasi-suspect
20 classification, and is therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny. See id. (noting that gender is a
21 quasi-suspect classification); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2000)
22 (noting that discrimination based on a person’s failure “to conform to socially-constructed
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gender expectations” is a form of gender discrimination) (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989)).⁶

Next, the Court must determine whether the policy satisfies intermediate scrutiny. Id. A policy subject to intermediate scrutiny must be supported by an “exceedingly persuasive justification.” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). The policy must serve important governmental objectives, and the government must show “that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.” Id. at 533 (citation omitted). While Defendants identify important governmental interests including military effectiveness, unit cohesion, and preservation of military resources, they fail to show that the policy prohibiting transgender individuals from serving openly is related to the achievement of those interests. (See Dkt. No. 69 at 33-35.) Indeed, “all of the reasons proffered by the President for excluding transgender individuals from the military [are] not merely unsupported, but [are] actually *contradicted* by the studies, conclusions, and judgment of the military itself.” Doe 1, 2017 WL 4873042, at *30 (emphasis in original). Not only did the DoD previously conclude that allowing transgender individuals to serve openly would not impact military effectiveness and readiness, the working group tasked to evaluate the issue also concluded that *prohibiting* open service would have negative impacts including loss of qualified personnel, erosion of unit cohesion, and erosion of trust in command. (See Dkt. Nos. 46 at ¶¶ 25-26; 48 at ¶¶ 45-47.)

Defendants’ arguments to the contrary are unavailing. While Defendants raise concerns about transition-related medical conditions and costs, their concerns “appear to be hypothetical

⁶ The June 2016 Policy also stated it was DoD’s position “consistent with the U.S. Attorney General’s opinion, that discrimination based on gender identity is a form of sex discrimination.” (See Dkt. No. 48, Ex. C at 6.)

1 and extremely overbroad.” Doe 1, 2017 WL 4873042, at *29. For instance, Defendants claim
2 that “at least some transgender individuals suffer from medical conditions that could impede
3 the performance of their duties,” including gender dysphoria, and complications from hormone
4 therapy and sex reassignment surgery. (See Dkt. No. 69 at 33-34.) But *all* service members
5 might suffer from medical conditions that could impede performance, and indeed the working
6 group found that it is common for service members to be non-deployable for periods of time
7 due to an array of such conditions. (Dkt. No. 46 at ¶ 22.) Defendants claim that
8 accommodating transgender service members would “impose costs on the military.” (Dkt. No.
9 69 at 34.) But the study preceding the June 2016 Policy indicates that these costs are
10 exceedingly minimal. (Dkt. Nos. 48, Ex. B at 57 (“[E]ven in the most extreme scenario . . . we
11 expect only a 0.13-percent (\$8.4 million out of \$6.2 billion) increase in [active component]
12 health care spending.”); 48 at ¶ 41 (“[T]he maximum financial impact . . . is an amount so small
13 it was considered to be ‘budget dust,’ hardly even a rounding error, by military leadership.”).)
14 Indeed, the cost to discharge transgender service members is estimated to be *more than 100*
15 *times greater* than the cost to provide transition-related healthcare. (See Dkt. Nos. 32 at 20; 46
16 at ¶ 32; 48 at ¶ 18.)

17 Defendants’ claim that the policy prohibiting transgender individuals from serving
18 openly is entitled to substantial deference is also unavailing. (See Dkt. No. 69 at 29.)
19 Defendants rely on Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). In Rostker the Supreme Court
20 considered whether the Military Selective Service Act (“MSSA”), which compelled draft
21 registration for men only, was unconstitutional. Id. at 59. Finding that the MSSA was enacted
22 after extensive review of legislative testimony, floor debates, and committee reports, the
23 Supreme Court held that Congress was entitled to deference when, in “exercising the
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1 congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules for their governance,” it
2 does not act “unthinkingly” or “reflexively and not for any considered reason.” See id. at 71-
3 72. In contrast, the prohibition on military service by transgender individuals was announced
4 by President Trump on Twitter, abruptly and without any evidence of considered reason or
5 deliberation. (See Dkt. No. 30 at ¶¶ 172-184.) The policy is therefore not entitled to Rostker
6 deference.⁷

7 Because Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the policy prohibiting transgender
8 individuals from serving openly is substantially related to important government interests, it does
9 not survive intermediate scrutiny.⁸ Plaintiffs are therefore likely to succeed on the merits of their
10 equal protection claim.

11 **ii. *Substantive Due Process***⁹

12 The Court finds that Plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits of
13 their substantive due process challenge. Substantive due process protects fundamental liberty
14 interests in individual dignity, autonomy, and privacy from unwarranted government intrusion.
15 See U.S. Const., amend. V. These fundamental interests include the right to make decisions
16 concerning bodily integrity and self-definition central to an individual’s identity. See Obergefell
17 v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2584 (2015) (“The Constitution promises liberty to all within its
18 reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow persons . . . to define and express
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20 ⁷ Defendants’ reliance on Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), is also misplaced. See
21 Doe 1, 2017 WL 4873042, at *30 n.11 (distinguishing the policy at issue in Weinberger as
having been “based on the ‘considered professional judgment’ of the military).

22 ⁸ For the same reasons, the policy is also unlikely to survive rational basis review.

23 ⁹ Having granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with regard to Plaintiffs’ procedural due
24 process challenge, the Court does not reach the merits of that claim at this time.

1 their identity.”); see also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984) (due process
2 “safeguards the ability independently to define one’s identity that is central to any concept of
3 liberty”). To succeed on their substantive due process challenge, Plaintiffs must establish a
4 governmental intrusion upon a fundamental liberty interest. The Court concludes that the policy
5 set forth in the Presidential Memorandum constitutes such an intrusion. The policy directly
6 interferes with Plaintiffs’ ability to define and express their gender identity, and penalizes
7 Plaintiffs for exercising their fundamental right to do so openly by depriving them of
8 employment and career opportunities. As discussed in the context of Plaintiffs’ equal protection
9 challenge, supra, Defendants have not demonstrated that this intrusion is necessary to further an
10 important government interest. Plaintiffs are therefore likely to succeed on the merits of their
11 substantive due process challenge.

12 **iii. *First Amendment***

13 The Court finds that Plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits of
14 their First Amendment challenge. In general, laws that regulate speech based on its content (i.e.,
15 because of “the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed”) are presumptively
16 unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218,
17 2226-27 (2015). Military regulations on speech are permitted so long as they “restrict speech no
18 more than is reasonably necessary to protect the substantial governmental interest.” Brown v.
19 Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 355 (1980).

20 Plaintiffs contend the policy set forth in the Presidential Memorandum impermissibly
21 burdens “speech or conduct that ‘openly’ discloses a transgender individual’s identity or
22 transgender status” by subjecting openly transgender individuals to discharge and other adverse
23 actions. (See Dkt. No. 30 at ¶¶ 196-197, 234-236.) The Court agrees. The policy penalizes
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1 transgender service members—but not others—for disclosing their gender identity, and is
2 therefore a content-based restriction. Even giving the government the benefit of a more
3 deferential standard of review under Brown, 444 U.S. at 355, the policy does not survive. As
4 discussed in the context of Plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge, supra, Defendants have not
5 demonstrated that the intrusion upon protected expression furthers an important government
6 interest.

7 **B. Irreparable Harm**

8 The Court finds that Plaintiffs are likely to suffer irreparable harm if an injunction does
9 not issue. The Individual and Organizational Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of
10 irreparable harm in the form of current and threatened injuries in fact, including denial of career
11 opportunities and transition-related medical care, stigmatic injury, and impairment of self-
12 expression. While Defendants claim these harms can be remedied with money damages (Dkt.
13 No. 69 at 23-24), they are incorrect. Unlike the plaintiffs in Anderson v. United States, 612
14 F.2d 1112 (9th Cir. 1979) and Hartikka v. United States, 754 F.2d 1516 (9th Cir. 1985), who
15 alleged harms "common to most discharged employees" (e.g., loss of income, loss of
16 retirement, loss of relocation pay, and damage to reputation) and not “attributable to any
17 unusual actions relating to the discharge itself,” Hartikka, 754 F.2d at 1518, the harms facing
18 the Individual Plaintiffs are directly attributable to the policy set forth in the Presidential
19 Memorandum. Back pay and other monetary damages proposed by Defendants will not
20 remedy the stigmatic injury caused by the policy, reverse the disruption of trust between
21 service members, nor cure the medical harms caused by the denial of timely health care. (See
22 Dkt. No. 84 at 28.) Moreover, to the extent Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of
23 their constitutional claims, these violations are yet another form of irreparable harm. See
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1 Associated Gen. Contractors, 950 F.2d at 1412 (“alleged constitutional infringement will often
2 alone constitute irreparable harm.”) (citation omitted); see also Klein v. City of San Clemente,
3 584 F.3d 1196, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2009) (“loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal
4 periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury”) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427
5 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)).

6 Plaintiff Washington State has demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm to its
7 sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests if it is “forced to continue to expend its scarce
8 resources to support a discriminatory policy when it provides funding or deploys its National
9 Guard.” (See Dkt. No. 97 at 8-9.) Washington State has also demonstrated that its ability to
10 recruit and retain service personnel for the Washington National Guard may be irreparably
11 harmed. See Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, Inc., 944 F.2d
12 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1991) (“intangible injuries, such as damage to ongoing recruitment efforts
13 and goodwill, qualify as irreparable harm.”).

14 **C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest**

15 The Court finds that the balance of equities and the public interest are in Plaintiffs’
16 favor. If a preliminary injunction does not issue, Plaintiffs will continue to suffer injuries as a
17 result of the Presidential Memorandum, including deprivation of their constitutional rights. On
18 the other hand, Defendants will face no serious injustice in maintaining the June 2016 Policy
19 pending resolution of this action on the merits. Defendants claim they are in the process of
20 “gathering a panel of experts” to study the military’s policy on transgender service members
21 and assert, without explanation, that an injunction will “directly interfere with the panel’s work
22 and the military’s ability to thoroughly study a complex and important issue regarding the
23 composition of the armed forces.” (Dkt. No. 69 at 40.) The Court is not convinced that
24

1 reverting to the June 2016 Policy, which was voluntarily adopted by DoD after extensive study
2 and review, and which has been in place for over a year without documented negative effects,
3 will harm Defendants. See Doe 1, 2017 WL 4873042, at *33 (recognizing “considerable
4 evidence that it is the *discharge* and *banning* of [transgender] individuals that would have such
5 [negative] effects”) (emphasis in original).

6 Injunctive relief furthers the public interest as it “is always in the public interest to
7 prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990,
8 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Defendants’ contention that the public has a strong
9 interest in national defense does not change this analysis, as “[a] bare invocation of ‘national
10 defense’ simply cannot defeat every motion for preliminary injunction that touches on the
11 military.” Doe 1, 2017 WL 4873042, at *33; Stone, 2017 WL 5589122, at *16.

12 CONCLUSION

13 Plaintiffs have standing to bring this lawsuit challenging Defendants’ policy of
14 prohibiting transgender individuals from serving openly in the military. Plaintiffs’ claims for
15 violations of equal protection, substantive due process, and the First Amendment are properly
16 plead and ripe for resolution, and Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction to protect the
17 status quo with regard to each of these claims. Plaintiffs have not properly plead a claim for
18 violation of procedural due process. Therefore, the Court rules as follows:

19 1. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs’
20 procedural due process claim;

21 2. The Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs’
22 equal protection, substantive due process, and First Amendment claims;

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

RYAN KARNOSKI, et al.

Plaintiffs,

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.

Defendants.

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Intervenor,

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.

Defendants.

CASE NO. C17-1297-MJP

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
CLARIFICATION AND PARTIAL
STAY OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Clarification and Motion for Partial Stay of Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal. (Dkt. No. 106.) Having reviewed the Motion, the Responses (Dkt. Nos. 114, 119), and all related papers, the Court

1 DENIES the proposed clarification set forth in Defendants' Motion for Clarification and
2 DENIES Defendant's Motion for Partial Stay of Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal.

3 BACKGROUND

4 On July 26, 2017, President Donald J. Trump announced on Twitter that the United
5 States government will no longer allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the
6 military. (Dkt. No. 34, Ex. 6.) Prior to this announcement, the military concluded that
7 transgender individuals should be permitted to serve openly. On June 30, 2016, the Secretary of
8 Defense issued a directive-type memorandum stating that "[n]ot later than July 1, 2017," the
9 military would begin accession of transgender enlistees. (Dkt. No. 48, Ex. C at § 2.) On June
10 30, 2017, Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis deferred the deadline to January 1, 2018. (Dkt.
11 No. 34-3.) President Trump's July 26, 2017 announcement and the August 25, 2017 Presidential
12 Memorandum thereafter prohibited the accession of openly transgender enlistees indefinitely (the
13 "Accessions Directive"). (Dkt. No. 34, Exs. 6, 7.)

14 On December 11, 2017, the Court entered an order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for a
15 Preliminary Injunction. (Dkt. No. 103.) The order enjoined Defendants from "taking any action
16 relative to transgender individuals that is inconsistent with the status quo that existed prior to
17 President Trump's July 26, 2017 announcement" regarding military service by transgender
18 individuals. (Id. at 23.)

19 Defendants now request clarification as to the terms of the Court's Order. (Dkt. No.
20 106.) Specifically, Defendants seek clarification as to whether Secretary Mattis may exercise
21 "independent discretion" to further postpone the January 1, 2018 deadline for accession by
22 transgender enlistees "to further study whether the policy will impact military readiness and
23 lethality or to complete further steps needed to implement the policy." (Id. at 2.) In the
24

1 alternative, Defendants move for a partial stay of the preliminary injunction as to the Accessions
2 Directive. (Id. at 4.)

3 DISCUSSION

4 I. Motion for Clarification

5 Defendants move for clarification of the Court's Order as to the Accessions Directive.
6 Essentially, Defendants contend that the Court's Order does not prohibit Secretary Mattis from
7 implementing a policy this Court has already enjoined. This claim is without merit. The Court's
8 Order clearly enjoined Defendants from "taking any action relative to transgender individuals
9 that is inconsistent with the status quo that existed prior to President Trump's July 26, 2017
10 announcement" regarding military service by transgender individuals. (Dkt. No. 103 at 23.)
11 Prior to July 26, 2017, the status quo was a policy permitting accession of transgender
12 individuals no later than January 1, 2018. (See Dkt. No. 48, Ex. C; Dkt. No. 34-3.) Any action
13 by any Defendant that is inconsistent with this status quo is preliminarily enjoined.

14 II. Motion for Partial Stay

15 In the alternative, Defendants move for a partial stay of the Court's Order granting a
16 preliminary injunction as to the Accessions Directive, pending review by the Ninth Circuit.
17 Defendants contend – for the first time during these proceedings – that they are not prepared to
18 begin accessions of transgender enlistees by January 1, 2018. (Dkt. No. 106 at 4-6.) Defendants
19 contend that Plaintiffs will not be harmed by a stay, and that they are likely to prevail on the
20 merits of their appeal. (Id. at 6-8.) The Court will not stay its preliminary injunction pending
21 appeal.

22 A stay pending appeal "is an intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and
23 judicial review." Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009) (citation omitted). In determining
24

1 whether to grant a stay, the Court considers: (1) whether Defendants have made a strong showing
2 that they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether Defendants will be irreparably injured
3 absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure Plaintiffs and Washington
4 State; and (4) whether the public interest supports a stay. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 434. The first
5 two factors are the most critical. Id.; see also Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1164 (9th
6 Cir. 2017).

7 **A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits**

8 The Court finds that Defendants have not made a “strong showing” that they are likely to
9 succeed on the merits of their appeal. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434. Each of the arguments raised by
10 Defendants already has been considered and rejected by the Court, and Defendants have taken no
11 action to remedy the constitutional violations that supported entry of a preliminary injunction in
12 the first place. (See Dkt. No. 103 at 15-20.) Defendants’ argument that Secretary Mattis has
13 “independent authority to extend the effective date” for accessions by transgender enlistees is
14 also unpersuasive. (Dkt. No. 106 at 7.) Secretary Mattis does not have authority to effectuate an
15 unconstitutional policy, and certainly not one which has been enjoined.

16 **B. Irreparable Injury to Defendants**

17 The Court finds that Defendants have not shown that they will be irreparably harmed
18 without a stay. Defendants contend that complying with the Court’s Order will “impose
19 extraordinary burdens” on the military as accession by transgender enlistees “necessitates
20 preparation, training, and communication to ensure those responsible for application of the
21 accession standards are thoroughly versed in the policy and its implementation procedures.”
22 (Dkt. 107 at ¶ 5; see also Dkt. No. 106 at 4-5.) In particular, Defendants claim that “the military
23 will need to promulgate new, complex, and interdisciplinary medical standards that will
24

1 necessarily require evaluation across several medical specialties, including behavior and mental
2 health, surgical procedures, and endocrinology.” (Dkt. No. 106 at 4-5.) Defendants have had
3 since June 2016 to prepare for accessions of transgender enlistees into the military, and the
4 record indicates that considerable progress has been made toward this end. (See Dkt. No. 115 at
5 ¶¶ 4-5; Dkt. No. 116 at ¶¶ 2-4; Dkt. No. 117 at ¶ 3.) In fact, on December 8, 2017, the
6 Department of Defense issued a policy memorandum setting forth specific guidance for
7 “processing transgender applicants for military service,” including guidelines for medical
8 personnel. (Dkt. No. 120-1.) Notwithstanding their implementation efforts to date, Defendants
9 claim that “the Department still would not be adequately and properly prepared to begin
10 processing transgender applicants for military service by January 1, 2018.” (Dkt. No. 107 at
11 107.) However, Defendants have provided no evidence that the accessions criteria for
12 transgender enlistees are any more complex or burdensome than the criteria for non-transgender
13 enlistees. (Dkt. No. 107 at ¶ 9.) Defendants’ conclusory claims are unsupported by evidence
14 and insufficient to establish a likelihood of irreparable harm.

15 C. Injury to Plaintiffs and Washington State and Impact on Public Interest

16 Having found that Defendants have not shown either a likelihood of success on the merits
17 or a likelihood of irreparable injury absent a stay, the Court need not reach the remaining factors.
18 See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d at 1164. However, the Court also finds that these remaining
19 factors do not support entry of a stay.

20 The Court already found that Plaintiffs and Washington State are likely to suffer
21 irreparable injury absent a preliminary injunction, and for the same reasons, will be injured by a
22 stay. With regard to the Individual Plaintiffs, the Court found that the Accessions Directive
23 violates their constitutional rights, denies them dignity, and subjects them to stigmatization. (Id.
24


1 at 8, 20-21.) With regard to Washington State, the Court found that the policy threatens the
2 State's ability to recruit and retain members of the Washington National Guard (and thereby
3 protect its territory and natural resources) and to protect its residents from discrimination. (Id. at
4 11-12, 21.) For similar reasons, the Court found that a preliminary injunction furthers the public
5 interest. (Dkt. No. 103 at 21-22.) Defendants have provided no evidence to the contrary.

6 CONCLUSION

7 Because Defendants have been enjoined from "taking *any action* relative to transgender
8 individuals that is inconsistent with the status quo that existed prior to President Trump's July 26,
9 2017 announcement" regarding military service by transgender individuals, the Court
10 CLARIFIES that *any action* intended to further delay the January 1, 2018 deadline for accession
11 by transgender enlistees is enjoined, whether taken by Secretary Mattis or any other government
12 agency or employee. Because Defendants have not demonstrated that a partial stay of the
13 Court's Order is warranted, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion.

14
15 The clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to all counsel.

16 Dated December 29, 2017.

17
18 
19 Marsha J. Pechman
United States District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

RYAN KARNOSKI, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. C17-1297-MJP

ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART
PLAINTIFFS' AND
WASHINGTON'S MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 129); the State of Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 150); and Defendants' Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 194.) Having reviewed the Motions, the Responses (Dkt. Nos. 194, 207, 209), the Replies (Dkt. Nos. 201, 202, 212) and all related papers, and having considered arguments made in proceedings before the Court, the Court rules as follows: The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs' and

1 Washington's Motions and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' Cross-
2 Motion.

3 **ORDER SUMMARY**

4 In July 2017, President Donald J. Trump announced on Twitter a ban on military service
5 by openly transgender people (the "Ban"). Plaintiffs and the State of Washington
6 ("Washington") challenged the constitutionality of the Ban, and moved for a preliminary
7 injunction to prevent it from being carried out.

8 In December 2017, the Court—along with three other federal judges—entered a
9 nationwide preliminary injunction preventing the military from implementing the Ban. The
10 effect of the order was to maintain the status quo, allowing transgender people to join and serve
11 in the military and receive transition-related medical care. For the past few months, they have
12 done just that.

13 In March 2018, President Trump announced a plan to implement the Ban. With few
14 exceptions, the plan excludes from military service people "with a history or diagnosis of gender
15 dysphoria" and people who "require or have undergone gender transition." The plan provides
16 that transgender people may serve in the military only if they serve in their "biological sex."
17 Defendants claim that this plan resolves the constitutional issues raised by Plaintiffs and
18 Washington.

19 In the following order, the Court concludes otherwise, and rules that the preliminary
20 injunction will remain in effect. Each of the claims raised by Plaintiffs and Washington remains
21 viable. The Court also rules that, because transgender people have long been subjected to
22 systemic oppression and forced to live in silence, they are a protected class. Therefore, any
23 attempt to exclude them from military service will be looked at with the highest level of care,
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and will be subject to the Court’s “strict scrutiny.” This means that before Defendants can implement the Ban, they must show that it was sincerely motivated by compelling interests, rather than by prejudice or stereotype, and that it is narrowly tailored to achieve those interests.

The case continues forward on the issue of whether the Ban is well-supported by evidence and entitled to deference, or whether it fails as an impermissible violation of constitutional rights. The Court declines to dismiss President Trump from the case and allows Plaintiffs’ and Washington’s claims for declaratory relief to go forward against him.

BACKGROUND

I. The Ban on Military Service by Openly Transgender People¹

President Trump’s Announcement on Twitter: On July 26, 2017, President Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) announced over Twitter that the United States would no longer “accept or allow” transgender people “to serve in any capacity in the U.S. military” (the “Twitter Announcement”):



(Dkt. No. 149, Ex. 1.)

¹ As used throughout this Order, and as explained in greater detail in this section, the “Ban” refers to Defendants’ policy generally prohibiting military service by openly transgender people, as announced in President Trump’s Twitter Announcement and 2017 Memorandum and as further detailed in the Implementation Plan and 2018 Memorandum.

1 ***The 2017 Memorandum:*** On August 25, 2017, President Trump issued a Presidential
2 Memorandum (the “2017 Memorandum”) formalizing his Twitter Announcement, and directing
3 the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security to “return” to an earlier policy excluding
4 transgender service members. (Dkt. No. 149, Ex. 2.) The 2017 Memorandum authorized the
5 discharge of openly transgender service members (the “Retention Directive”); prohibited the
6 accession of openly transgender service members (the “Accession Directive”); and prohibited the
7 use of Department of Defense (“DoD”) and Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
8 resources to fund “sex reassignment” surgical procedures (the “Medical Care Directive”). (*Id.* at
9 §§ 1-3.) The Accession Directive was to take effect on January 1, 2018; the Retention and
10 Medical Care Directives on March 23, 2018. (*Id.* at § 3.) The 2017 Memorandum also ordered
11 the Secretary of Defense to “submit to [President Trump] a plan for implementing both [its]
12 general policy . . . and [its] specific directives . . .” no later than February 21, 2018. (*Id.*)

13 ***Secretary Mattis’ Press Release and Interim Guidance:*** On August 29, 2017, Secretary
14 of Defense James N. Mattis issued a press release confirming that the DoD had received the
15 2017 Memorandum and, as directed, would “carry out” its policy direction. (Dkt. No. 197, Ex.
16 2.) The press release explained that Secretary Mattis would “develop a study and
17 implementation plan” and “establish a panel of experts . . . to provide advice and
18 recommendation on the implementation of the [P]resident’s direction.” (*Id.*)

19 On September 14, 2017, Secretary Mattis issued interim guidance regarding President
20 Trump’s Twitter Announcement and 2017 Memorandum to the military (the “Interim
21 Guidance”). (Dkt. No. 149, Ex. 3.) The Interim Guidance again identified the DoD’s intent to
22 “carry out the President’s policy and directives” and “present the President with a plan to
23 implement the policy and directives in the [2017] Memorandum.” (*Id.* at 2.) The Interim
24

Guidance provided (1) that transgender people would be prohibited from accession effective immediately; (2) that service members diagnosed with gender dysphoria would be provided “treatment,” however, “no new sex reassignment surgical procedures for military personnel [would] be permitted after March 22, 2018”; and (3) that no action would be taken “to involuntarily separate or discharge an otherwise qualified Service member solely on the basis of a gender dysphoria diagnosis or transgender status.” (*Id.* at 3.)

The Implementation Plan: On February 22, 2018, as directed, Secretary Mattis delivered to President Trump a plan for carrying out the policies set forth in his Twitter Announcement and 2017 Memorandum (Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 1) along with a “Report and Recommendations on Military Service by Transgender Persons” (Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 2) (collectively, the “Implementation Plan”). The Implementation Plan recommended the following policies:

- Transgender persons with a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria are disqualified from military service, except under the following limited circumstances: (1) if they have been stable for 36 consecutive months in their biological sex prior to accession; (2) Service members diagnosed with gender dysphoria after entering into service may be retained if they do not require a change of gender and remain deployable within applicable retention standards; and (3) currently serving Service members who have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria since the previous administration’s policy took effect and prior to the effective date of this new policy, may continue to serve in their preferred gender and receive medically necessary treatment for gender dysphoria.
- Transgender persons who require or have undergone gender transition are disqualified from military service.
- Transgender persons without a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria, who are otherwise qualified for service, may serve, like all other Service members, in their biological sex.

(Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 1 at 3-4.)

1 ***The 2018 Memorandum:*** On March 23, 2018, President Trump issued another
2 Presidential Memorandum (the “2018 Memorandum”). (Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 3.) The 2018
3 Memorandum confirms his receipt of the Implementation Plan, purports to “revoke” the 2017
4 Memorandum and “any other directive [he] may have made with respect to military service by
5 transgender individuals,” and directs the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security to
6 “exercise their authority to implement any appropriate policies concerning military service by
7 transgender individuals.” (Id. at 2-3.)

8 **II. The Carter Policy**

9 In 2010, Congress repealed the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy that had previously
10 prevented gay, lesbian, and bisexual people from serving openly in the military. (Dkt. No. 145 at
11 ¶ 10.) The repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” raised questions about the military’s policy on
12 transgender service members, as commanders became increasingly aware that there were capable
13 and experienced transgender service members in every branch of the military. (Id. at ¶ 11; Dkt.
14 No. 146 at ¶ 7.) In August 2014, the DoD eliminated its categorical ban on retention of
15 transgender service members, enabling each branch of military service to reassess its own
16 policies. (Dkt. No. 145 at ¶ 12; Dkt. No. 146 at ¶ 8.) In July 2015, then-Secretary of Defense
17 Ashton Carter convened a group to evaluate policy options regarding openly transgender service
18 members (the “Working Group”). (Dkt. No. 142 at ¶ 8.) The Working Group included senior
19 uniformed officials from each branch, a senior civilian official, and various staff members. (Id.
20 at ¶ 9.) It sought to “identify and address all relevant issues relating to service by openly
21 transgender persons.” (Id. at ¶ 22.) To do so, it consulted with medical experts, personnel
22 experts, readiness experts, and commanders whose units included transgender service members,
23 and commissioned an independent study by the RAND Corporation to assess the implications of
24

1 allowing transgender people to serve openly (the “RAND Study”). (Id. at ¶¶ 10-11, 22-27.) In
2 particular, the RAND Study focused on: (1) the health care needs of transgender service
3 members and the likely costs of providing coverage for transition-related care; (2) the readiness
4 implications of allowing transgender service members to serve openly; and (3) the experiences of
5 foreign militaries that allow for open service. (Dkt. No. 144, Ex. B at 4.) The RAND Study
6 found “no evidence” that allowing transgender people to serve openly would adversely impact
7 military effectiveness, readiness, or unit cohesion. (Dkt. No. 144 at ¶ 14.) Instead, the RAND
8 Study found that discharging transgender service members would reduce productivity and result
9 in “significant costs” associated with replacing skilled and qualified personnel. (Dkt. No. 142 at
10 ¶ 21.) The results of the RAND Study were published in a 113-page report titled “Assessing the
11 Implications of Allowing Transgender Personnel to Serve Openly.” (See Dkt. No. 144, Ex. B.)

12 After reviewing the results of the RAND Study and other evidence, the Working Group
13 unanimously agreed that (1) transgender people should be allowed to serve openly and (2)
14 excluding them from service based on a characteristic unrelated to their fitness to serve would
15 undermine military efficacy. (Dkt. No. 142 at ¶¶ 26-27.) On June 30, 2016, Secretary Carter
16 accepted the recommendations of the Working Group and issued Directive-type Memorandum
17 16-005 (the “Carter Policy”), which affirmed that “service in the United States military should be
18 open to all who can meet the rigorous standards for military service and readiness.” (Dkt. No.
19 144, Ex. C.) The Carter Policy provided that “[e]ffective immediately, no otherwise qualified
20 service member may be involuntarily separated, discharged or denied reenlistment or
21 continuation of service, solely on the basis of their gender identity,” and further provided that
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23
24

1 transgender people would be allowed to accede into the military not later than July 1, 2017.² (Id.
2 at 5.) Consistent with the Carter Policy, each branch of military service issued detailed
3 instructions, policies, and regulations regarding separation and retention, accession, in-service
4 transition, and medical care. (Dkt. No. 144 at ¶¶ 24-36, Exs. D, E, F; Dkt. No. 145 at ¶¶ 41-50,
5 Exs. A, B; Dkt. No. 146 at ¶¶ 27-34, Ex. A.)

6 In reliance upon the Carter Policy and the DoD's assurances that it would not discharge
7 them for being transgender, many service members came out to the military and had been
8 serving openly for more than a year when President Trump issued his Twitter Announcement
9 and 2017 Memorandum. (Dkt. No. 144, ¶ 37; Dkt. No. 145 at ¶ 51; Dkt. No. 146 at ¶ 35.)

10 **III. Procedural History**

11 On August 28, 2017, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the
12 Ban, as set forth in the Twitter Announcement and the 2017 Memorandum. (See Dkt. No. 1.)
13 Plaintiffs include nine transgender individuals (the "Individual Plaintiffs") and three
14 organizations (the "Organizational Plaintiffs"). (Dkt. No. 30 at ¶¶ 7-18.) Individual Plaintiffs
15 Ryan Karnoski, D.L., and Connor Callahan aspire to enlist in the military; Staff Sergeant
16 Cathrine Schmid, Chief Warrant Officer Lindsey Muller, Petty Officer First Class Terece Lewis,
17 Petty Officer Second Class Phillip Stephens, and Petty Officer Second Class Megan Winters
18 currently serve openly in the military. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-13.) Individual Plaintiff Jane Doe currently
19 serves in the military, but does not serve openly. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Organizational Plaintiffs include
20 the Human Rights Campaign ("HRC"), the Gender Justice League ("GJL"), and the American
21
22

23 ² On June 30, 2017, Secretary Mattis extended the effective date for accepting
24 transgender recruits to January 1, 2018. (Dkt. No. 197, Ex. 3.)

1 Military Partner Association (“AMPA”). (*Id.* at ¶¶ 16-18.) Defendants include President Trump,
 2 Secretary Mattis, the United States, and the DoD. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 19-22.)

3 On November 27, 2017, the Court granted intervention to Washington, which joined to
 4 protect its sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests in its natural resources and in the health and
 5 physical and economic well-being of its residents. (*See* Dkt. No. 101.)

6 On December 11, 2017, the Court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction barring
 7 Defendants from “taking any action relative to transgender individuals that is inconsistent with
 8 the status quo that existed prior to President Trump’s July 26, 2017 announcement.”³ (Dkt. No.
 9 103 at 23.) The Court found that Plaintiffs and Washington had standing to challenge the Ban
 10 and were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims for violation of equal protection,
 11 substantive due process, and the First Amendment. (*Id.* at 6-12, 15-20.)

12 On January 25, 2018, Plaintiffs and Washington filed separate motions for summary
 13 judgment.⁴ (Dkt. Nos. 129, 150.) Both seek an order declaring the Ban unconstitutional and
 14 permanently enjoining its implementation. (Dkt. No. 129 at 28-29; Dkt. No. 150-1.)

15 On February 28, 2018, Defendants filed an opposition and cross-motion for partial
 16 summary judgment seeking dismissal of all claims brought against President Trump. (Dkt. No.
 17 194.)

19 ³ Three other district courts also entered preliminary injunctions against the Ban. *See*
 20 *Doe 1 v. Trump*, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167 (D.D.C. 2017); *Stone v. Trump*, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747 (D.
 Md. 2017); *Stockman v. Trump*, No. 17-cv-1799-JGB-KK, Dkt. No. 79 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22,
 2017).

21 ⁴ Plaintiffs are joined by amici the Constitutional Accountability Center (Dkt. No. 163,
 22 Ex. 1); Legal Voice (Dkt. No. 169); Retired Military Officers and Former National Security
 23 Officials (Dkt. No. 152, Ex. A); and the Commonwealths of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania,
 24 the States of California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, New Jersey,
 New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and the District of Columbia (Dkt.
 No. 170, Ex. A.)

1 On March 23, 2018, as these motions were pending and only days before the Court was
2 set to hear oral argument, President Trump issued the 2018 Memorandum. (Dkt. No. 214, Ex.
3 1.) On March 27, the Court ordered the parties to present supplemental briefing on the effect of
4 the 2018 Memorandum and the Implementation Plan. (Dkt. No. 221.) That briefing has now
5 been completed and this matter is ready for ruling. (See Dkt. Nos. 226, 227, 228.)

6 DISCUSSION

7 I. Legal Standard

8 Summary judgment is proper if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
9 any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
10 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue
11 of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To defeat a motion for
12 summary judgment, the non-movant must point to facts supported by the record which
13 demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S.
14 871, 888 (1990). Conclusory, non-specific statements are not sufficient. Id. Similarly, “a party
15 cannot manufacture a genuine issue of material fact merely by making assertions in its legal
16 memoranda.” S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense v. Walter Kidde & Co., Inc., 690
17 F.2d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 1982).

18 II. Plaintiffs’ and Washington’s Motions for Summary Judgment

19 Plaintiffs and Washington contend that summary judgment is proper because the Ban is
20 unsupported by any constitutionally adequate government interest as a matter of law, and
21 therefore violates equal protection, substantive due process, and the First Amendment. (Dkt. No.
22 129 at 15-28; Dkt. No. 150 at 13-23.) Defendants respond that disputes of material fact preclude
23 summary judgment, including disputes as to (1) whether Plaintiffs’ and Washington’s challenges
24

1 are moot as a result of the 2018 Memorandum; (2) whether Plaintiffs and Washington have
2 standing; and (3) whether the Ban satisfies the applicable level of scrutiny. (Dkt. No. 194 at
3 5-24; Dkt. No. 226 at 3-11.) The Court addresses each of these issues in turn:

4 **A. Mootness**

5 Defendants claim that Plaintiffs' and Washington's challenges are now moot, as the
6 policy set forth in the 2017 Memorandum has been "revoked" and replaced by that in the 2018
7 Memorandum. (Dkt. No. 226 at 3-7.) Defendants claim the "new policy" has "changed
8 substantially," such that it presents a "substantially different controversy." (*Id.* at 6 (citations
9 omitted.)) Plaintiffs and Washington respond that there is no "new policy" at all, as the 2018
10 Memorandum and the Implementation Plan merely implement the directives of the 2017
11 Memorandum. (Dkt. No. 227 at 2; Dkt. No. 228 at 7-8.)

12 "The burden of demonstrating mootness 'is a heavy one.'" Los Angeles County v. Davis,
13 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33
14 (1953)). The Ninth Circuit has explained that a case is not moot unless "subsequent events make
15 it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to
16 recur," McCormack v. Herzog, 788 F.3d 1017, 1024 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Friends of the
17 Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)), such that "the
18 litigant no longer ha[s] any need of the judicial protection that is sought." Jacobus v. Alaska,
19 338 F.3d 1095, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S.
20 216, 224 (2000)). Accordingly, courts find cases moot only where the challenged policy has
21 been completely revoked or rescinded, not merely voluntarily ceased. See Davis, 440 U.S. at
22 631 (holding that a case is moot only where "there can be no reasonable expectation" that the
23 alleged violation will recur and "interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably
24

1 eradicated the effects of the alleged violation”); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455
2 U.S. 283, 289 (1982) (holding that “a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice
3 does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice”); see also
4 McCormack, 788 F.3d at 1025 (noting that a case is not moot where the government never
5 “repudiated . . . as unconstitutional” the challenged policy).

6 The Court finds that the 2018 Memorandum and the Implementation Plan do not
7 substantively rescind or revoke the Ban, but instead threaten the very same violations that caused
8 it and other courts to enjoin the Ban in the first place. The 2017 Memorandum prohibited the
9 accession and authorized the discharge of openly transgender service members (the Accession
10 and Retention Directives); prohibited the use of DoD and DHS resources to fund transition-
11 related surgical procedures (the Medical Care Directive); and directed Secretary Mattis to submit
12 “a plan for implementing” both its “general policy” and its “specific directives” no later than
13 February 21, 2018. (Dkt. No. 149, Ex. 2 at §§ 1-3.) The 2017 Memorandum did not direct
14 Secretary Mattis to determine *whether* or not the directives should be implemented, but instead
15 ordered the directives to be implemented by specific dates and requested a plan for *how* to do so.

16 The Implementation Plan adheres to the policy and directives set forth in the 2017
17 Memorandum with few exceptions: With regard to the Accession and Retention Directives, the
18 Implementation Plan excludes from military service and authorizes the discharge of transgender
19 people who “require or have undergone gender transition” and those “with a history or diagnosis
20 of gender dysphoria” unless they have been “stable for 36 consecutive months in their biological
21 sex prior to accession.” (Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 1 at 3-4.) With regard to the Medical Care Directive,
22 the Implementation Plan provides that the military will, with few exceptions, no longer provide
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1 transition-related surgical care (as people who “require . . . gender transition” will no longer be
2 permitted to serve and those who are currently serving will be subject to discharge). (Id.)

3 Defendants claim that the 2018 Memorandum and the Implementation Plan differ from
4 the 2017 Memorandum in that they do not mandate a “categorical” prohibition on service by
5 openly transgender people and “contain[] several exceptions allowing some transgender
6 individuals to serve.” (Dkt. No. 226 at 6-7). The Court is not persuaded. The Implementation
7 Plan prohibits transgender people—including those who have neither transitioned nor been
8 diagnosed with gender dysphoria—from serving, unless they are “willing and able to adhere to
9 all standards associated with their biological sex.” (Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 1 at 4, Ex. 2 at 7.)
10 Requiring transgender people to serve in their “biological sex”⁵ does not constitute “open”
11 service in any meaningful way, and cannot reasonably be considered an “exception” to the Ban.
12 Rather, it would force transgender service members to suppress the very characteristic that
13 defines them as transgender in the first place.⁶ (See Dkt. No. 143 at ¶ 19 (“The term
14 ‘transgender’ is used to describe someone who experiences any significant degree of
15

16 ⁵ The Court notes that the Implementation Plan uses the term “biological sex,” apparently
17 to refer to the sex one is assigned at birth. This is somewhat misleading, as the record indicates
18 that gender identity—“a person’s internalized, inherent sense of who they are as a particular
19 gender (i.e., male or female)”—is also widely understood to have a “biological component.”
(See Dkt. No. 143 at ¶¶ 20-21.)

20 ⁶ While the Implementation Plan contains an exception that allows current service
21 members to serve openly and in their preferred gender and receive “medically necessary”
22 treatment for gender dysphoria, the exception is narrow, and applies only to those service
23 members who “were diagnosed with gender dysphoria by a military medical provider after the
24 effective date of the Carter [P]olicy” (i.e., June 30, 2016) but “before the effective date” of the
policy set forth in the Implementation Plan. (Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 2 at 7-8.) Further, this exception
is severable from the remainder of the Implementation Plan. (Id. at 7 (“[S]hould [the DoD]’s
decision to exempt these Service members be used by a court as a basis for invalidating the
entire policy, this exemption is and should be deemed severable from the rest of the policy.”).)

1 misalignment between their gender identity and their assigned sex at birth.”); Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 2
2 at 9 n.10 (“[T]ransgender” is “an umbrella term used for individuals who have sexual identity or
3 gender expression that differs from their assigned sex at birth.”)

4 Therefore, the Court concludes that the 2018 Memorandum and the Implementation Plan
5 do not moot Plaintiffs’ and Washington’s existing challenges.

6 **B. Standing**

7 Defendants claim that Plaintiffs and Washington lack standing to challenge the Ban, and
8 that the 2018 Memorandum and Implementation Plan “have significantly changed the analysis.”
9 (Dkt. No. 194 at 6-12; Dkt. No. 226 at 7.)

10 Standing requires (1) an “injury in fact”; (2) a “causal connection between the injury and
11 the conduct complained of”; and (3) a likelihood “that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
12 decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (internal quotation
13 marks and citations omitted). An “injury in fact” exists where there is an invasion of a legally
14 protected interest that is both “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not
15 conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. at 560 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

16 While the Court previously concluded that both Plaintiffs and Washington established
17 standing at the preliminary injunction stage (Dkt. No. 103 at 7-12), their burden for doing so on
18 summary judgment is more exacting and requires them to set forth “by affidavit or other
19 evidence ‘specific facts’” such that a “fair-minded jury” could find they have standing. Id. at
20 561; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).

21 The Court considers standing for the Individual Plaintiffs, the Organizational Plaintiffs,
22 and Washington in turn:

1. Individual Plaintiffs

Each of the Individual Plaintiffs has submitted an affidavit detailing the ways in which they have already been harmed by the Ban, and would be further harmed were it to be implemented. (See Dkt. Nos. 130-138.) While Defendants claim that “Plaintiffs are obviously not suffering any harm from the revoked 2017 Memorandum,” and “would neither sustain an actual injury nor face an imminent threat of future injury” as a result of the 2018 Memorandum, the Court disagrees and concludes that each of the Individual Plaintiffs has standing to challenge the Ban.

Karnoski, D.L., and Callahan have “taken clinically appropriate steps to transition” and would be excluded from acceding under the Implementation Plan. (Dkt. No. 130 at ¶ 10; Dkt. No. 132 at ¶ 8; Dkt. No. 137 at ¶ 8.) Whether they could have acceded under the Carter Policy and whether they might be able to obtain “waivers,” as Defendants suggest, are irrelevant. (See Dkt. No. 226 at 8.) As the Court previously found, their injury “lies in the denial of an equal *opportunity* to compete, not the denial of the job itself,” and the Court need not “inquire into the plaintiff’s qualifications (or lack thereof) when assessing standing.” (Dkt. No. 103 at 10 n.3 (citing Shea v. Kerry, 796 F.3d 42, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2015)) (emphasis in original).)

Doe does not currently serve openly, but was intending to come out and to transition surgically before President Trump’s Twitter Announcement. (Dkt. No. 138 at ¶¶ 8-11.) The Ban unambiguously subjects her to discharge should she seek to do either. (See Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 1.) Schmid, Muller, Lewis, Stephens, and Winters have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria, and likewise would be subject to discharge under the Ban.⁷ (Dkt. No. 131 at ¶ 9; Dkt. No. 133 at

⁷ Defendants claim that the currently serving Plaintiffs were “diagnosed with gender dysphoria within the relevant time period” and “therefore would be able to continue serving in their preferred gender, change their gender marker, and receive all medically necessary

¶ 15; Dkt. No. 134 at ¶ 10; Dkt. No. 135 at ¶ 10; Dkt. No. 136 at ¶ 10.) The threat of discharge facing Doe, Schmid, Muller, Lewis, Stephens, and Winters is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical,” and clearly gives rise to standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Importantly, even if each of the Individual Plaintiffs were granted waivers or otherwise not excluded, discharged, or denied medical care, there can be no dispute that they would nevertheless have standing to challenge the Ban. This is because the Ban already has denied them the opportunity to serve in the military on the same terms as others; has deprived them of dignity; and has subjected them to stigmatization. (See Dkt. No. 103 at 8.) Policies that “stigmatiz[e] members of [a] disfavored group as ‘innately inferior’ . . . can cause serious non-economic injuries to those persons who are personally denied equal treatment solely because of their membership in a disfavored group.” Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 737-740 (1984) (citation omitted). Such stigmatic injury, when identified in specific terms, is “one of the most serious consequences of discriminatory government action and is sufficient in some circumstances to support standing.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984), abrogated on other grounds, 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).

treatment” under the Implementation Plan’s narrow exception. (Dkt. No. 226 at 8.) The record does not support this claim. As noted previously, the exception applies only to current service members who “were diagnosed with gender dysphoria by a military medical provider *after* the effective date of the Carter [P]olicy” (i.e., June 30, 2016) but “before the effective date” of the policy set forth in the Implementation Plan. (See supra, n.6; Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 2 at 7-8 (emphasis added).) The record suggests that many, if not all, of the currently serving Plaintiffs were diagnosed *before* June 30, 2016. For example, Schmid was diagnosed “approximately four years ago.” (Dkt. No. 131 at ¶ 9.) Muller was diagnosed “approximately six years ago.” (Dkt. No. 133 at ¶ 15.) Lewis, Stephens, and Winters were diagnosed “approximately three years ago,” “approximately two and a half years ago,” and “approximately two years ago” respectively. (Dkt. No. 134 at ¶ 10; Dkt. No. 135 at ¶ 10; Dkt. No. 136 at ¶ 10.) There is also no indication that any of the currently serving Plaintiffs received their diagnosis from a “military medical provider.”

Each of the Individual Plaintiffs has detailed the stigmatic injuries they have suffered through affidavits. For example, Karnoski has explained that the Ban has caused him “great distress, discomfort, and pain.” (Dkt. No. 130 at ¶ 21.) Schmid has explained that the Ban’s “abrupt change in policy and implicit commentary on [her] value to the military and competency to serve has caused [her] to feel tremendous anguish,” and that since it was announced, she has lost sleep and suffered “an immense amount of anxiety.” (Dkt. No. 131 at ¶¶ 23-24, 26.) Muller has explained that the Ban was “devastating” and “wounded [her] more than any combat injury could.” (Dkt. No. 133 at ¶¶ 30-31.) Doe has explained that the Ban precludes her from expressing her authentic gender identity, and that as a result, she has not come out. (Dkt. No. 138 at ¶¶ 10-11.) Doe’s self-censorship alone is a “constitutionally sufficient injury,” as it is based on her “actual and well-founded fear” of discharge. See Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a person’s “actual and well-founded fear that [a] law will be enforced against him or her” may give rise to standing to bring pre-enforcement claims under the First Amendment and that “self-censorship is ‘a harm that can be realized even without an actual prosecution’”) (quoting Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988)).

Therefore, the Court concludes that each of the Individual Plaintiffs has standing.

2. Organizational Plaintiffs

As each of the Individual Plaintiffs has standing, so too do the organizations they represent. An organization has standing where “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333,

343 (1977). Each of the Organizational Plaintiffs satisfies these requirements. Karnoski and Schmid are members of HRC, GJL, and AMPA, and Muller, Stephens, and Winters are also members of AMPA. (Dkt. No. 130 at ¶ 3; Dkt. No. 131 at ¶ 5; Dkt. No. 133 at ¶ 5; Dkt. No. 135 at ¶ 4; Dkt. No. 136 at ¶ 4; Dkt. No. 140 at ¶ 3.) The interests each Organizational Plaintiff seeks to protect are germane to their organizational purposes, which include ending discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (“LGBTQ”) individuals (HRC and GJL) and supporting families and allies of LGBT service members and veterans (AMPA). (Dkt. No. 139 at ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 140 at ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 141 at ¶ 2.)

Therefore, the Court concludes that each of the Organizational Plaintiffs has standing.

3. Washington

Defendants claim that “Washington has not even attempted to satisfy its burden to demonstrate standing,” and that “in granting Washington’s motion to intervene, the Court expressly declined to decide whether Washington possessed standing to sue.” (Dkt. No. 194 at 12.) To the contrary, the Court explicitly found that Washington had standing in its own right, and not merely as an intervenor. (Dkt. No. 103 at 11-12.)

A state has standing to sue the federal government to vindicate its sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests. See Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 518-520 (2007). Sovereign interests include a state’s interest in protecting the natural resources within its boundaries. Id. at 518-19. Quasi-sovereign interests include its interest in “the health and well-being—both physical and economic—of its residents,” and in “securing residents from the harmful effects of discrimination.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607, 609 (1982).

1 Washington contends that the Ban will impede its ability to protect its residents and
2 natural resources and will undermine the efficacy of its National Guard. (Dkt. No. 150 at 9-10.)
3 Washington is home to approximately 60,000 active, reserve, and National Guard members, and
4 the military is the second largest public employer in the state. (Id. at 9.) Washington is also
5 home to approximately 32,850 transgender adults, and its laws protect these residents against
6 discrimination on the basis of sex, gender, and gender identity. (Id. at 9-10); RCW §§ 49.60.030;
7 49.60.040(25)-(26).

8 Washington relies on the National Guard to assist with emergency preparedness and
9 disaster recovery planning, and to protect the state's residents and natural resources from
10 wildfires, landslides, flooding, and earthquakes. (Dkt. No. 150 at 9.) When the Governor
11 deploys the National Guard for state active duty, Washington pays its members' wages and
12 provides disability and life insurance benefits for injuries they may sustain while serving the
13 state. (Id.); RCW § 38.24.050. The state also oversees recruitment efforts and exercises
14 day-to-day command over Guard members in training and most forms of active duty. (Dkt. No.
15 170, Ex. A at 20.) Further, the Governor must ensure that the Guard conforms to both federal
16 and state laws and regulations, including the state's anti-discrimination laws and, were the Ban to
17 be implemented, conflicting DoD policies regarding accession and retention. (Dkt. No. 150 at
18 9-10; Dkt. No. 170, Ex. A at 21-22.) Thus, in addition to diminishing the number of eligible
19 members for the National Guard, the Ban threatens Washington's ability to (1) protect its
20 residents and natural resources in times of emergency and (2) "assur[e] its residents that it will
21 act" to protect them from "the political, social, and moral damage of discrimination." See
22 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 609. Defendants have not offered any contrary evidence with respect to
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1 Washington's sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests. Therefore, the Court concludes that
2 Washington has standing.

3 **C. Constitutional Violations**

4 Plaintiffs contend that the Ban violates equal protection, substantive due process, and the
5 First Amendment. (Dkt. No. 129 at 15-28.) Washington contends that the Ban violates equal
6 protection and substantive due process. (Dkt. No. 150 at 13-23.) Before it can reach the merits
7 of these constitutional claims, the Court must determine (1) the applicable level of scrutiny and
8 (2) the applicable level of deference owed to the Ban, if any. The Court addresses each of these
9 issues in turn:

10 **1. Level of Scrutiny**

11 At the preliminary injunction stage, the Court found that transgender people were, at
12 minimum, a quasi-suspect class. (Dkt. No. 103 at 15-16.) In light of additional evidence before
13 it at this stage, the Court today concludes that they are a suspect class, such that the Ban must
14 satisfy the most exacting level of scrutiny if it is to survive.

15 In determining whether a classification is suspect or quasi-suspect, the Supreme Court
16 has observed that relevant factors include: (1) whether the class has been "[a]s a historical
17 matter . . . subjected to discrimination," Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987); (2)
18 whether the class has a defining characteristic that "frequently bears [a] relation to ability to
19 perform or contribute to society," City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
20 440-41 (1985); (3) whether the class exhibits "obvious, immutable, or distinguishing
21 characteristics that define [it] as a discrete group," Bowen, 483 U.S. at 602; and (4) whether the
22 class is "a minority or politically powerless." Id.; see also Windsor v. U.S., 699 F.3d 169, 181
23 (2d Cir. 2012), aff'd on other grounds, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). While "[t]he presence of any of the
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1 factors is a signal that the particular classification is ‘more likely than others to reflect
2 deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective,’”
3 the first two factors alone may be dispositive. Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F.
4 Supp. 2d 968, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting Pyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982)).

5 The Court considers each of these factors in turn:

6 **i. History of Discrimination**

7 The history of discrimination and systemic oppression of transgender people in this
8 country is long and well-recognized. Transgender people have suffered and continue to suffer
9 endemic levels of physical and sexual violence, harassment, and discrimination in employment,
10 education, housing, criminal justice, and access to health care. (See Dkt. No. 169, Ex. A at
11 9-12.) According to a nationwide survey conducted by the National Center for Transgender
12 Equality in 2015, 48 percent of transgender respondents reported being “denied equal treatment,
13 verbally harassed, and/or physically attacked in the past year because of being transgender” and
14 47 percent reported being “sexually assaulted at some point in their lifetime.” (Id. at 10.)
15 Seventy-seven (77) percent report being “verbally harassed, prohibited from dressing according
16 to their gender identity, or physically or sexually assaulted” in grades K-12. (Id. at 10-11.)
17 Thirty (30) percent reported being “fired, denied a promotion, or experiencing some other form
18 of mistreatment in the workplace related to their gender identity or expression, such as being
19 harassed or attacked.” (Id. at 11.) Finally, “it is generally estimated that transgender women
20 face *4.3 times the risk* of becoming homicide victims than the general population.” (Id. at 10
21 (emphasis in original).)

1 **ii. Contributions to Society**

2 Discrimination against transgender people clearly is unrelated to their ability to perform
3 and contribute to society. See Doe 1, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 209 (noting the absence of any
4 “argument or evidence suggesting that being transgender in any way limits one’s ability to
5 contribute to society”); Adkins v. City of New York, 143 F. Supp. 3d 134, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
6 (noting the absence of “any data or argument suggesting that a transgender person, simply by
7 virtue of transgender status, is any less productive than any other member of society”). Indeed,
8 the Individual Plaintiffs in this case contribute not only to society as a whole, but to the military
9 specifically. For years, they have risked their lives serving in combat and non-combat roles,
10 fighting terrorism around the world, and working to secure the safety and security of our forces
11 overseas. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 133 at ¶¶ 7-9; Dkt. No. 134 at ¶¶ 5-6; Dkt. No. 135 at ¶¶ 6-7; Dkt.
12 No. 136 at ¶¶ 6-7.) Their exemplary service has been recognized by the military itself, with
13 many having received awards and distinctions. (See Dkt. No. 131 at ¶ 15; Dkt. No. 133 at ¶ 12;
14 Dkt. No. 134 at ¶ 7.)

15 **iii. Immutability**

16 Transgender people clearly have “immutable” and “distinguishing characteristics that
17 define them as a discrete group.” Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of
18 Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 874 (S.D Ohio 2016) (quoting Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638
19 (1986)). Experts agree that gender identity has a “biological component,” and there is a
20 “medical consensus that gender identity is deep-seated, set early in life, and *impervious to*
21 *external influences*.” (Dkt. No. 143 at ¶¶ 21-22 (emphasis added).) In other contexts, the Ninth
22 Circuit has held that “[s]exual orientation and sexual identity” are “immutable” and are “so
23 fundamental to one’s identity that a person should not be required to abandon them.”
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1 Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds,
 2 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005).

3 **iv. Political Power**

4 Despite increased visibility in recent years, transgender people as a group lack the
 5 relative political power to protect themselves from wrongful discrimination. While the exact
 6 number is unknown, transgender people make up less than 1 percent of the nation's adult
 7 population. (Dkt. No. 143, Ex. B at 3 (estimating 0.3 percent)); see also Doe 1, 275 F. Supp. 3d
 8 at 209 (estimating 0.6 percent). Fewer than half of the states have laws that explicitly prohibit
 9 discrimination against transgender people. (Dkt. No. 169, Ex. A at 12.) Further, recent actions
 10 by President Trump's administration have removed many of the limited protections afforded by
 11 federal law. (Id. at 12-13.) Finally, openly transgender people are vastly underrepresented in
 12 and have been "systematically excluded from the most important institutions of
 13 self-governance." SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 484 (9th Cir.
 14 2014). There are no openly transgender members of the United States Congress or the federal
 15 judiciary, and only one out of more than 7,000 state legislators is openly transgender. (Dkt. No.
 16 169, Ex. A at 14); see also Adkins, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 140.

17 Recognizing these factors, courts have consistently found that transgender people
 18 constitute, at minimum, a quasi-suspect class.⁸ See, e.g., Doe 1, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 208-10;

20 ⁸ The Ninth Circuit applies heightened scrutiny to equal protection claims involving
 21 discrimination based on sexual orientation. SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 484; Latta v. Otter, 771
 22 F.3d 456, 468 (9th Cir. 2014). This reasoning further supports the Court's conclusion as to the
 23 applicable level of scrutiny, as discrimination based on transgender status burdens a group that
 24 has in many ways "experienced even greater levels of societal discrimination and
 marginalization." Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 n.8; see also Adkins, 143 F. Supp. 3d at
 140 ("Particularly in comparison to gay people . . . transgender people lack the political strength
 to protect themselves. . . . [A]lthough there are and were gay members of the United States

1 Stone, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 768; Adkins, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 139-40; Highland, 208 F. Supp. 3d at
2 873-74; Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Today, the Court
3 concludes that transgender people constitute a suspect class. Transgender people have long been
4 forced to live in silence, or to come out and face the threat of overwhelming discrimination.

5 Therefore, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ and Washington’s favor
6 as to the applicable level of scrutiny. The Ban specifically targets one of the most vulnerable
7 groups in our society, and must satisfy strict scrutiny if it is to survive.

8 **2. Level of Deference**

9 Defendants claim that “considerable deference is owed to the President and the DoD in
10 making military personnel decisions,” and that for this reason, Plaintiffs’ and Washington’s
11 constitutional claims necessarily fail. (Dkt. No. 194 at 16.)

12 The Court previously found that the Ban—as set forth in President Trump’s Twitter
13 Announcement and 2017 Memorandum—was not owed deference, as it was not supported by
14 “any evidence of considered reason or deliberation.” (Dkt. No. 103 at 17-18.) Indeed, at the
15 time he announced the Ban, “all of the reasons proffered by the President for excluding
16 transgender individuals from the military were not merely unsupported, but were actually
17 *contradicted* by the studies, conclusions, and judgment of the military itself.” Doe 1, 275 F.
18 Supp. 3d at 212 (emphasis in original); see also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67-72 (1981)
19 (concluding that deference is owed to well-reasoned policies that are not adopted “unthinkingly”
20 or “reflexively and not for any considered reason”); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,
21 507-08 (1986) (concluding that deference is owed where a policy results from the “professional
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24 Congress . . . as well as gay federal judges, there is no indication that there have ever been any
transgender members of the United States Congress or federal judiciary.”)

1 judgment of military authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military
2 interest”); compare Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291, 305 (D.D.C. 1978) (concluding that
3 deference is not owed where a policy is adopted “casually, over the military’s objections and
4 without significant deliberation”).

5 Now that the specifics of the Ban have been further defined in the 2018 Memorandum
6 and the Implementation Plan, whether the Court owes deference to the Ban presents a more
7 complicated question. Any justification for the Ban must be “genuine, not hypothesized or
8 invented post hoc in response to litigation.” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
9 However, the Court is mindful that “complex[,] subtle, and professional decisions as to the
10 composition . . . and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments,”
11 reserved for the Legislative and Executive Branches. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973).
12 The Court’s entry of a preliminary injunction was not intended to prevent the military from
13 continuing to review the implications of open service by transgender people, nor to preclude it
14 from *ever* modifying the Carter Policy.

15 Defendants claim that the military has done just that, and that the Ban—as set forth in the
16 2018 Memorandum and the Implementation Plan—is now the product of a deliberative review.
17 In particular, Defendants claim the Ban has been subjected to “an exhaustive study” and is
18 consistent with the recommendations of a “Panel of Experts” convened by Secretary Mattis to
19 study “military service by transgender individuals, focusing on military readiness, lethality, and
20 unit cohesion,” and tasked with “conduct[ing] an independent multi-disciplinary review and
21 study of relevant data and information pertaining to transgender Service members.” (See Dkt.
22 No. 226 at 9-10; Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 2 at 19.) Defendants claim that the Panel was comprised of
23 senior military leaders who received “support from medical and personnel experts from across
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1 the [DoD] and [DHS],” and considered “input from transgender Service members, commanders
2 of transgender Service members, military medical professionals, and civilian medical
3 professionals with experience in the care and treatment of individuals with gender dysphoria.”
4 (Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 2 at 20.) “Unlike previous reviews on military service by transgender
5 individuals,” Defendants claim that the Panel’s analysis was “informed by the [DoD]’s own data
6 obtained since the new policy began to take effect last year.” (Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 1 at 3.) The
7 Panel’s findings are set forth in a 44-page “Report and Recommendations on Military Service by
8 Transgender Persons,” which concludes that “the realities associated with service by transgender
9 individuals are far more complicated than the prior administration or RAND had assumed,” and
10 that because gender transition “would impede readiness, limit deployability, and burden the
11 military with additional costs . . . the risks associated with maintaining the Carter [P]olicy . . .
12 counsel in favor of” the Ban. (Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 2 at 46.)

13 Having carefully considered the Implementation Plan—including the content of the
14 DoD’s “Report and Recommendations on Military Service by Transgender Persons”—the Court
15 concludes that whether the Ban is entitled to deference raises an unresolved question of fact.
16 The Implementation Plan was not disclosed until March 29, 2018. (See Dkt. No. 224, Exs. 1, 2.)
17 As Defendants’ claims and evidence regarding their justifications for the Ban were presented to
18 the Court only recently, Plaintiffs and Washington have not yet had an opportunity to test or
19 respond to these claims. On the present record, the Court cannot determine whether the DoD’s
20 deliberative process—including the timing and thoroughness of its study and the soundness of
21 the medical and other evidence it relied upon—is of the type to which Courts typically should
22 defer. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(1).

Accordingly, the Court DENIES summary judgment as to the level of deference due. The Court notes that, even in the event it were to conclude that deference is owed, it would not be rendered powerless to address Plaintiffs’ and Washington’s constitutional claims, as Defendants seem to suggest. “‘The military has not been exempted from constitutional provisions that protect the rights of individuals’ and, indeed, ‘[i]t is precisely the role of the courts to determine whether those rights have been violated.’” Doe 1, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 210 (quoting Emory v. Sec’y of Navy, 819 F.2d 291, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) (“This Court has never held, nor do we now hold, that military personnel are barred from all redress in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of military service.”); Rostker, 453 U.S. at 70 (“[D]eference does not mean abdication.”). Indeed, the Court notes that Defendants’ claimed justifications for the Ban—to promote “military lethality and readiness” and avoid “disrupt[ing] unit cohesion, or tax[ing] military resources”—are strikingly similar to justifications offered in the past to support the military’s exclusion and segregation of African American service members, its “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, and its policy preventing women from serving in combat roles. (Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 1 at 2-4; see also Dkt. No. 163, Ex. 1 at 8-16.)

3. Equal Protection, Due Process, and First Amendment Claims

A policy will survive strict scrutiny only where it is motivated by a “compelling state interest” and “the means chosen ‘fit’ the compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate . . . prejudice or stereotype.” Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) (citation omitted). In making this determination, the Court must carefully evaluate “the importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced” by the government for the use of a particular classification in a particular context. Id. at 327.

Whether Defendants have satisfied their burden of showing that the Ban is constitutionally adequate (i.e., that it was sincerely motivated by compelling state interests, rather than by prejudice or stereotype) necessarily turns on facts related to Defendants' deliberative process. As discussed previously, these facts are not yet before the Court. (See supra, § II.C.2.) Further, Defendants' responsive briefing addresses only the constitutionality of the Interim Guidance, a document that has never been, and is not now, the applicable policy before the Court. (See Dkt. No. 194 at 19-24.)

For the same reasons it cannot grant summary judgment as to the level of deference due at this stage, the Court cannot reach the merits of the alleged constitutional violations. Accordingly, the Court DENIES summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' and Washington's equal protection, due process, and First Amendment claims.

IV. Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Defendants contend that the Court is without jurisdiction to impose injunctive or declaratory relief against President Trump in his official capacity, and move for partial summary judgment on all claims against him individually. (Dkt. No. 194 at 25-27.) Plaintiffs and Washington do not oppose summary judgment as to injunctive relief, but respond that declaratory relief against President Trump is proper. (Dkt. No. 207 at 8-10; Dkt. No. 209 at 6-8.)

The Court is aware of no case holding that the President is immune from declaratory relief—Rather, the Supreme Court has explicitly affirmed the entry of such relief. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 425 n.9 (1998) (affirming entry of declaratory judgment against President Clinton stating that Line Item Veto Act was unconstitutional); NTEU v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 609 (1974) (“[N]o immunity established under any case known to this Court bars every suit against the president for injunctive, declaratory or mandamus relief.”); see also Hawaii

1 v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 788 (9th Cir. 2017) (vacating injunctive relief against President Trump,
2 but not dismissing him in suit for declaratory relief), vacated as moot, 874 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir.
3 2017).

4 The Court concludes that, not only does it have jurisdiction to issue declaratory relief
5 against the President, but that this case presents a “most appropriate instance” for such relief.
6 See NTEU, 492 F.2d at 616. The Ban was announced by President Trump (@realDonaldTrump)
7 on Twitter, and was memorialized in the 2017 and 2018 Presidential Memorandums, which were
8 each signed by President Trump. (Dkt. No. 149, Exs. 1, 2; Dkt. No. 224, Ex. 3.) While
9 President Trump’s Twitter Announcement suggests he authorized the Ban “[a]fter consultation
10 with [his] Generals and military experts” (Dkt. No. 149, Ex. 1), Defendants to date have failed to
11 identify even one General or military expert he consulted, despite having been ordered to do so
12 repeatedly. (See Dkt. Nos. 204, 210, 211.) Indeed, the *only* evidence concerning the lead-up to
13 his Twitter Announcement reveals that military officials were entirely unaware of the Ban, and
14 that the abrupt change in policy was “unexpected.” (See Dkt. No. 208, Ex. 1 at 9 (General
15 Joseph F. Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stating on July 27, 2017 “Chiefs, I
16 know yesterday’s announcement was unexpected . . .”); Dkt. No. 152, Ex. A at 11-12 (“The Joint
17 Chiefs of Staff were not consulted at all on the decision . . . The decision was announced so
18 abruptly that White House and Pentagon officials were unable to explain the most basic of
19 details about how it would be carried out.”).) Even Secretary Mattis was given only one day’s
20 notice before President Trump’s Twitter Announcement. (Id.; Dkt. No. 163, Ex. 1 at 26.) As no
21 other persons have ever been identified by Defendants—despite repeated Court orders to do so—
22 the Court is led to conclude that the Ban was devised by the President, and the President alone.
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1 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment with
2 regard to injunctive relief and DENIES the motion with regard to declaratory relief.

3 CONCLUSION

4 The Court concludes that all Plaintiffs and Washington have standing; that the 2018
5 Memorandum and Implementation Plan do not moot their claims; and that transgender people
6 constitute a suspect class necessitating a strict scrutiny standard of review. The Court concludes
7 that questions of fact remain as to whether, and to what extent, deference is owed to the Ban, and
8 whether the Ban, when held to strict scrutiny, survives constitutional review.

9 Accordingly, the Court rules as follows:

10 1. The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' and Washington's motions for summary judgment
11 with respect to the applicable level of scrutiny, which is strict scrutiny;

12 2. The Court DENIES Plaintiffs' and Washington's motions for summary judgment
13 with respect to the applicable level of deference;

14 3. The Court DENIES Plaintiffs' and Washington's motions for summary judgment
15 with respect to violations of equal protection, due process, and the First Amendment;

16 4. The Court GRANTS Defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment with
17 respect to injunctive relief against President Trump and DENIES the cross-motion with respect
18 to declarative relief against President Trump.

19 5. The preliminary injunction previously entered otherwise remains in full force and
20 effect. Defendants (with the exception of President Trump), their officers, agents, servants,
21 employees, and attorneys, and any other person or entity subject to their control or acting directly
22 or indirectly in concert or participation with Defendants are enjoined from taking any action
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1 relative to transgender people that is inconsistent with the status quo that existed prior to
2 President Trump's July 26, 2017 announcement.

3 6. The Court's ruling today eliminates the need for Plaintiffs and Washington to
4 respond to Defendants' Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. No. 223), which is
5 hereby STRICKEN.

6 7. The parties are directed to proceed with discovery and prepare for trial on the
7 issues of whether, and to what extent, deference is owed to the Ban and whether the Ban violates
8 equal protection, substantive due process, and the First Amendment.

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10 The clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to all counsel.

11 Dated April 13, 2018.

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14 Marsha J. Pechman
15 United States District Judge
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

RYAN KARNOSKI,

Plaintiff,

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP,

Defendant.

CASE NO. C17-1297-MJP

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
STAY PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Stay the Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal. (Dkt. No. 238.) Having reviewed the Motion, the Responses (Dkt. Nos. 250, 257), the Reply (Dkt. No. 261), the Jurisdictional Briefing (Dkt. Nos. 275, 276, 277) and all related papers, the Court DENIES the Motion.

Background

On December 11, 2017, the Court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction barring Defendants from "taking any action relative to transgender individuals that is inconsistent with the status quo" that existed prior to President Trump's July 26, 2017 announcement" of a policy

1 excluding transgender people from serving openly in the military (the “Ban”). (Dkt. No. 103 at
2 23.)

3 On March 23, 2018, Defendants released an Implementation Plan and a 2018
4 Memorandum which purported to “revoke” the 2017 Memorandum and replace it with a “new
5 policy” that does not mandate a “categorical prohibition on transgender service members,” but
6 rather targets those who have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria. (Dkt. No. 226 at 3-7; see
7 also Dkt. No. 224, Exs. 1, 3.)

8 On April 13, 2018, the Court granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiffs and the
9 State of Washington, and ordered the preliminary injunction to remain in effect. (See Dkt. No.
10 233.) In so doing, the Court rejected Defendants’ claim that the subsequent Implementation Plan
11 and 2018 Memorandum represented a “new policy.” (Id. at 12.) Instead, the Court found that
12 the Implementation Plan and 2018 Memorandum “threaten the very same violations that caused
13 it and others to enjoin the Ban in the first place.” (Id.)

14 On April 30, 2018, Defendants filed a notice of appeal with the Ninth Circuit. (See Dkt.
15 No. 236.) On the same day, Defendants filed this motion requesting an expedited ruling no later
16 than May 4, 2018. (Dkt. No. 238.) After the Court declined to issue an expedited ruling (Dkt.
17 No. 240), Defendants filed a separate Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal in the Ninth Circuit.
18 See Karnoski v. Trump, No. 18-35347, Dkt. No. 3 (9th Cir. May 4, 2018). The Ninth Circuit has
19 yet to issue a ruling.

20 Discussion

21 I. Jurisdiction

22 While the filing of a notice of appeal generally divests a district court of jurisdiction,
23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c) allows the Court “to issue further orders with respect to an
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1 injunction, even pending appeal, in order to preserve the status quo or ensure compliance with its
2 earlier orders.” Doe v. Trump, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2018) (citing Nat. Res. Def.
3 Council, Inc. v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 242 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001)). The Court’s
4 exercise of jurisdiction may not “adjudicate anew the merits of the case” nor “materially alter the
5 status of the case on appeal.” Southwest Marine, 242 F.3d at 1166.

6 **II. Motion to Stay**

7 A stay pending appeal “is an intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and
8 judicial review.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009) (internal quotation marks and
9 citation omitted). In determining whether to grant a stay, the Court considers: (1) whether
10 Defendants have made a strong showing that they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether
11 Defendants will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether a stay will substantially injure
12 Plaintiffs and Washington; and (4) whether the public interest supports a stay. Id. at 434.

13 **A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits**

14 The Court finds that Defendants have not made a “strong showing” that they are likely to
15 succeed on the merits of their appeal.

16 First, each of the arguments raised by Defendants already has been considered and
17 rejected by the Court, and Defendants have done nothing to remedy the constitutional violations
18 that supported entry of a preliminary injunction in the first instance. Instead, Defendants
19 attempt, once again, to characterize the Implementation Plan and 2018 Memorandum as a “new
20 and different” policy, distinct from the one this Court and others enjoined. (See Dkt. No. 261 at
21 3.) The Court was not persuaded by this argument before, and it is not persuaded now.

22 Second, while Defendants claim—without explanation—that “the Ninth Circuit and/or
23 this Court ultimately . . . are highly likely to conclude that significant deference is appropriate”
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(Dkt. No. 238 at 5), whether *any* deference is due remains unresolved. (See Dkt. No. 233 at 24-27.) Defendants bear the burden of providing a “genuine” justification for the Ban. To withstand judicial scrutiny, that justification must “describe actual state purposes, not rationalizations” and must not be “hypothesized or invented *post hoc* in response to litigation.” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 535-36 (1996); see also Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S.Ct. 1678, 1696-97 (2012). To date, Defendants have steadfastly refused to put before the Court evidence of any justification that predates this litigation. (See Dkt. No. 211.)

Finally, the Court notes that the Ban currently is enjoined by four separate courts. See Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167 (D.D.C. 2017); Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747 (D. Md. 2017); Stockman v. Trump, No. 17-cv-1799-JGB-KK, Dkt. No. 79 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2017). As a practical matter, Defendants face the challenge of convincing each of these courts to lift their injunctions before they may implement the Ban.

B. Likelihood of Irreparable Harm

The Court finds that Defendants have not shown that they will be irreparably harmed without a stay. Defendants contend that unless stayed, the injunction “will irreparably harm the government (and the public) by compelling the military to adhere to a policy it has concluded poses substantial risks.” (Dkt. No. 238 at 2.) In particular, Defendants contend that allowing transgender people to serve openly—as they have for nearly two years—threatens to “undermine readiness, disrupt unit cohesion, and impose an unreasonable burden on the military that is not conducive to military effectiveness and lethality.” (*Id.* at 3.)

Since the preliminary injunction has been in effect, the Senate Committee on Armed Services has heard testimony from high-ranking military officials on the effect of open service

1 by transgender people. Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley testified that he “monitor[s]
2 very closely” the situation and had received “precisely zero” reports of problems related to unit
3 cohesion, discipline, and morale. (Dkt. No. 255, Ex. 14 at 6.) Chief of Naval Operations
4 Admiral John Richardson testified that he, too, had received no negative reports, and that in his
5 experience, “[i]t’s steady as she goes.” (Dkt. No. 255, Ex. 15.) As this testimony makes clear,
6 Defendants’ hypothetical and conclusory claims are unsupported by evidence and do not
7 establish a likelihood of irreparable harm.

8 **C. Injury to Plaintiffs and Washington and Impact on Public Interest**

9 Having found that Defendants have not established either a likelihood of success on the
10 merits or a likelihood of irreparable harm absent a stay, the Court need not reach these remaining
11 factors. See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d at 1164. However, the Court also finds that these
12 factors do not support entry of a stay.

13 The Court already found that Plaintiffs and Washington are likely to suffer irreparable
14 injury absent a preliminary injunction, and for the same reasons, will be injured by a stay. (See
15 Dkt. No. 103 at 20-21.) Further, maintaining the injunction pending appeal advances the
16 public’s interest in a strong national defense, as it allows skilled and qualified service members
17 to continue to serve their country.

18 **D. Scope of the Preliminary Injunction**

19 The Court declines to stay the preliminary injunction insofar as it grants nationwide
20 relief. While Defendants contend that the injunction should be limited to the nine Individual
21 Plaintiffs (Dkt. No. 238 at 2), the Court disagrees. The scope of injunctive relief is to be
22 “dictated by the extent of the violation established.” Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702
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1 (1979). The Ban, like the Constitution, would apply nationwide. Accordingly, a nationwide
2 injunction is appropriate.

3 **Conclusion**

4 Because Defendants have not established that a stay of the preliminary injunction is
5 appropriate, the Court DENIES Defendants' Motion. The status quo shall remain "steady as she
6 goes," and the preliminary injunction shall remain in full force and effect nationwide.

7 The clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to all counsel.

8 Dated June 15, 2018.

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10 The Honorable Marsha J. Pechman
11 United States Senior District Court Judge
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FILED

JUL 18 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

RYAN KARNOSKI; et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Attorney
General's Office Civil Rights Unit,

Intervenor-Plaintiff-
Appellee,

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official
capacity as President of the United States; et
al.,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 18-35347

D.C. No. 2:17-cv-01297-MJP
Western District of Washington,
Seattle

ORDER

Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.

On December 11, 2017, the district court granted appellees' motion for a preliminary injunction. On March 29, 2018, appellants moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction in light of the March 23, 2018 presidential memorandum and proposed Department of Defense policy. On April 13, 2018, the district court declined to dissolve the preliminary injunction and struck appellants' motion. On April 30, 2018, appellants' filed the instant appeal.

Before the court is appellants' motion for a stay of the December 11, 2017 preliminary injunction pending this appeal of the April 13, 2018 order striking

appellant's motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. Appellant's motion in this court requests neither emergency nor expedited treatment.

A stay pending appeal "is an intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial review." *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The district court's December 11, 2017 preliminary injunction preserves the status quo, allowing transgender service members to serve in the military in their preferred gender and receive transition-related care. Appellants ask this court to stay the preliminary injunction, pending the outcome of this appeal, in order to implement a new policy. Accordingly, a stay of the preliminary injunction would upend, rather than preserve, the status quo.

Therefore, we deny the motion for a stay of the December 11, 2017 preliminary injunction (Docket Entry No. 3).

Briefing is complete.